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The Sherman Act: Its Relation to the Common Law.
The thesis of this dissertation is emlraced in the following'
syllogism: 1. The eoraraon law follows certain v/ell defined rules in
regard to restraint of trade and monopolies. 2. The Sherman Act,
under the cases now recognized as authoritative, follaws the same
rules. 3. Therefore common law principles may he used to deter-
mine the application of the Act, It follc's as a corollary that
"the rule of reason" is the rule of what has been decided to he reas-
onable in the decisions of the common law.
%
In Heydon's case, 3 Coke 7, the Larons of the Sxchecuer lay down
the following rules: 'Vor the sure and true interpretation of statutes
in general, be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging cf
the common law, four things are to be discerned and considered: ( 1 ) A
V/hat v/as the common law before the making of the act? (2) E ’.Vhat was
the mischief and defect against which the common law did not provide?
(3) G V/hat remedy the parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure
the disease of the commonwealth, and f4) D The true reason of the
remedy." it will be seen that the major premise of the syllogism is
contained in (1), and the minor premise in (2), (3), and (4). The
discussion accordingly falls under those heads.
I. The Common lav;. fLIajor Premise.)
A. "".7hat v/as the common law before the making of the act?"
1. Restraint of trade.
a. Glassification of restraint of trade.
(1) Involuntary restraints.
: 3 .C
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Grants or charters from the cro77n
.
A nev; charter of incorporation to traie generally.
This is void. 3 Go. 121.
A grant to particular persons for the sole exercise
of any known trade. This is void because it is a
monopoly, and against the policy of the common lav/
and I.iagna Charta. 11 Co. 34.
Grant of sole use for a newly in^'ented art. This




Such as are for the benefit of some particular per-
sons v/ho are alleged to use a trade for the advan-
tage of a community. These are good. 3 Co. 125.
2 Bulst. 195.
Such as are for the benefit of a community of perso>?^
who are not alleged but are supposed to use the
trade in order to exclude foreigners. 3 Go. 121.
This was abolished by St. 5 and 6 '7. 4, c. 76 s . 14.
A custom may be good to restrain a trade in a par-
ticular place though none are ever supposed or al-
leged to use it.
Restraints of trade by by-laws.
To exclude foreigners. This is good if only to
enforce a precedent custom by penalt 3’’. 1 Roll,
Abr. 364.
All bj^’-laws made to cramp trade in general are void.
By-laws made to restrain trade, for '‘he better gov-
V. irjno' f- :{•»• a 't
•
ri'x?>:iv5fio - 'fo. i-.Jiiii'xS'
.*^t f-i-^-iy- r;;. lo: ^••TOi'^'J: o W*'K 'A
'
';
.m '. oU.-e- .^^cv 8 i3 '
„?ri'r’r'35ro ;iIo? r^rirf T’o'r '^.si :t- riip'irq; ; 0 ‘^ rtfr^.'i'j A
ii 'ai i.i ri-jfjapffd' riov fir ar.’Ofi::. '^q
Si-.'S
r-qTfOf T'o qlif^rrnri'.v p ': o "o"' ^'fn S£? ;ioir*
''etS‘ Oo &9‘EOn'fT:;''^ j ‘‘'"‘' r ^ :*»rip. j a.T v'tis oilw
. .
dC V. .^'^ 1^-— *' - f b: < p[l 0 :'.jti*io
.
-‘'X .« 'V .*1 . ’ 3 inr ?. . 'to 1 f*ns b!?!?-
rrj r • ': ^o.oo \;i»4n mov'eyjc a-f:'T 2, ;'.i. B
>1 '
-









..,,>1- ,.J’ ’*d li-iJ j C sit tiftH;
/^
-*
' 0 - ’'f^o ‘:r ^' ^ r f ril' . ? ‘ji'rot sf-j.-Ioxo oT
.
r'rp!: '' .*^‘ 7 -Tr?'; 0
'. .icfA
.
O’’ r>’r#‘ X^^'tf^ft^'’a di cT-t ffiatr d.X XXA
(oV
5





qO .1 r . aJ'ta'uG i3a.^BU Xiia
*. V





















r* y la'i •: St: p'orji,. 's'
'f ‘'' i.'.*f





ri rv r „r p
,





ernment rej^ulation of it are food, if
a’’ They are for the henefit of the place,
h'* To avoid piihlic inconvenience, etc.
c'' i’or the advantafe of the trade. Raym. 288 .
Voluntary restraints.
(a) General restraints. These are all void, whether
by bond, with or v/itbout consideration, and whether
it be the party’s own trade or not.
(b) Particualr restraints.
a' V/ithout consideration. These are void.
b' V/ith consideration. Where a contract for restraint
of trade appears to be made upon a rood and ade-
quate consideration, so as to mal^e it a proper and
useful contract, it is good, or
Voluntary restraints.
(a) Trade of one of the parties restrained.
a’ Limited in regard to the time or place. This la
good
.
b' Unlimited in regard to time or place. This is
always bad
.
(b) Trade of another restrained, i. e., a contract to
restrain, not in restraint of trade.
a' If the parties have no business of their own of
that nature the contract is bad, as the ,iustifica-
ticn of promoting another trade is wanting and it
is done maliciously.
b' If the natural and expected result is to restrain
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lawful means, it is g'ocd as it promotes one trade
as much as it injures the other,
c’ If unlawful means are used
,
the contract is al-
v/ays had
.
Discussion of the elements of contracts i" restraint of
trade
.
U) i’rora the point of viev/ 0^ the public .
(2) From the point of view of the individual .
Requisites of leg-itimate restraint.
(1) The contract must he partial.
(2) The consideration must he adequate.
(3) The restraint must he reasonable.
(a) Injury to the party restrained.
fh) Injury to the public.




(1) Monopolies hy franchise.
(a) Mediaeval franchises. This accompanied the mono-
poly system - franhfold an :1 park, warren and pis-
cary, smithy and bakehouse, mill and market.
Fitxwalter ' s case, 3 Eeh. 242. In the towns the
trading an': craft guilds were also monopolies,
j’reemantle v. Silk Throwsters, 1 Lev. 229.
(b) Patents and mononolies. These were originally
instituted towards the end of the sixteenth century
as a method of encouragement to nov/ enterprises and
large industries, but soon began to be felt as a
'' P'T^O'f"' it i: B.d f', „ 0 - fv/: , fclQBfnt
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ties were granted in this way as
favorites. Case of Ilonopo lies
,
luOdern franchises. The test of
franchise in modern times is the
of the public.
Public health.
a*' Cleaning streets, etc. In
b'' Slaughtering of animals.
rewards to court
11 Co. S4 b.






a’’ Sale of liquor. Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 Eed.903.
b*' fiduciary business. People v. San Prancisco
ICO Cal. 605.
c'' Skilled employments. The State v. V/ilccx,
64 Han. 739.
o' Public institutions.
a'' Schools. Bancroft v. Thayer, 5 Sawy. 502.
b'' Public works. Verdin v. St. Louis, 151 Mo. 36.
d’ Public services.
a’’ Transportation. '.food v. Seattle, 23 V/ash . 1.
b’’ Public utilities. People v. People’s Gas
Light etc. Co. 205 111. 432.
Llonox^olies by combination.
(a) Early forms of monopolization.
a' Forestalling the market. This consisted of buying
up necessaries on their way to market or contracting
for the control of anything coming toward the
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market, or ever of holding out inducements to raise
their prices or withhold their commodities from
market. Botelor v. V/ashing-ton , 2 Cranch. G.d 676.
h’ Regrating-. This consisted of buying necessaries
after they were in the market, with intent to sell
them in the same market at an advanced price, or
even contracting for the delivery of goods in ad-
vance of the market with like intent. Rex v. Rus-
hy, 2 Reake IT. P. 139.
c' Engrossing the market. The buying of necessaries
at markets or elsev/here with intent to sell agamij
,
and especially much buying of this sort with such
intent constituted the offence. Rex v. Maynard
Cero. Car. 231.
d' Conspiracies against trade. From, earliest times
if several combined to control trade or advance
prices it was a serious offence v/hether actual in-
jury resulted or not. Anon. 12 Mod. 243.
(b) Modern forms of monopolies.
a' Pools. ov/ift V. United States, 196 U.S. 375.
b' License or lease. Oliver v. Gilmore, 52 Red. 562.




d’ Holding corporations. McCutcheon v. Ueiz Capsule
Co. 71 Red. 737 co-ntra, Trenton Potteries Co. v.
Oliphant, 53 IT. J. Eq
.
507.
b. Piscussion of the elements of monopolization.
(1) Enjoyment of a right.
(2) Exclusion of others from this right.
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c. Evils of monopoly.
(1) Ihe price of tho commclity raise!.
(2) The commodity not sc merchantahle as hefore.
(3) The impoverishment of those excluded.
II. The Sherman Act. fllinor Premise.)
B. ”'./hat was the mischief and defect against v/hich the common law
did not proTiuoV”
1. The absence of common law in the federal law.
a. All United States law derived from the dons titut ion
.
h. Lack of constitutional provisions in regard to restraint
cf trade.
C. "V/hat remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appo^^nted to cure
the disease of t?ie cor.imenwealth . ” (Effects of the Act.)
a.. The ACt and its application.
a. Text of the Act.
b. To what is it applicable?
(1) Constitutionality of the Act.
(a) Power cf Congress over interstate commerce,
jb) Power of Congrees over corporations created by the
States
.
(2) 7hat is interstate commerce?
(a) actual transportation of commodities and persons
between states
.
(b) The instrumentalities and processes o'’ such trans-
9
-pcrtation.
(c) All negotiations and contracts which have for t’»^eir
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( 3 ) distinct iojn ‘bstv/een preparation for and participation
in interstate commerce.
(a) Participat icn in interstate ccirraerce, and ownership
of stock in companies eng'afed therein.
History of the interpretation of the Act.
(1) The first period: the period of donht . 1890-1897.
(L^ron the passing' of the ^ct to the Trans -His son ri
freight Assocaaticn case.)
(2) The second period: the period of rigid interpretation.
1897-1911. fii’rom the Trans-Iiissonri Freight Associa-
tion case to the standard Oil case.)
(3) The third v)eriod: the period of liberal interpretation;
1911 to date. (From the Standard Oil case to date.)
(4) The economic effect of the shifting of the judicial
point of viev/ in regard to the Act.
Restraint of trade according to the cases.
(1) Period of interpretation as affecting decisions.
(2) Divisions of restraint of trade.
(a) General restraints of trade. These are tad.
fb) Partial restraints of trade,
a' In respect to time.
b’ In respect to place. These are determined by
reasonableness and the existence of a consideration
to support the contract, but no line of reasonable-




(3) Piestraint of trade made a misdemeanor. ThiS| goes a
step beyond the common law because restraints of trade
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were formerly unlawful merely, and werenot indictable
except in certain cases such as the monopolization of
necessaries. In re Green, 52 i?>d. 104.
(4) ^ict and intent must concur. This is a criminal stat-
ute and accord ir.g-ly tl e rule o"^ the criminal law in re-
gard to act and intent must "be brought into it. In re
Corning, 51 ii’ed. 205. This however is a rule of plead-
ing rather tha:] of positive law since the intent is de-
ducihle from the act.
(5) Jistinction hetv/een restraint in staple commodities and
in others.
(6) The rule of direct restraint.
(1) The rule of competition.
fS) The rule of reason.
(9) Intent under the act.
flO) Conspiracy under the act.
2. Monopoly according; to the cases.
a. ‘ The meaning of monopolization.
b. Tne gist of monopolization.
(1) Necessity for combination and conspiracy.
(2) necessity for a wrongful elem*ent.
c. Dangers of monopolization.
(1) The power to fix the price and injure the nublic.
(2) Enabling limitation on production.
(3) Danger of deter iorat ion of monopolized article.
d. Attempts to raon oxidize.
D. "The true reason of the remedy." (Purpose of the Act.)
1. To provide a remedy against the trusts.
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comparison of I and II it appears that the ef-^ect of the
Sherman act in regard to restraint of trade and monopolies is the
same as that of the common lav; except in regard to remedy, vfhich
is essentially adjective and not substantive lav;.
Corollary.
It follov;s from the identity of the principles involved in
the Sherman Act and the English Common Lav; that the "rnle of
reason" is the "reason" of the decided cases in England and the
United‘S States before the passage of the Act, and hence is definite
and possible of exact determination.

The Sherman Act: Its Relation to the Common law
The thesis of this dissertation is embraced in the following-
syllogism: 1. The common law follows certain well-defined roles in re
gard to restraint of trade and monopolies. 2. The Sherman Act,
under the cases now recognized as aiithcritat ive
,
follows the same
rules. 3. Therefore Common Law principles should he used to det'^r-
mine the application of the Act. It follows as a corollar;^ that
''the rule of reason" is the rule of wV'at >^as been decided to he reason
able in the decision of the Common law.
In Heydon's case, 3 Coke 7, the Barons of the Exchequer la;^ down
the following rules : "ii’or the sure and true interpretation c statutes
in general, be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of
the common law, four things are to be discerned and considered; fl) A
'.7hat was the common law before the making of the act? (2) B '.That was
the mischief and defect against whic’' the common law did not provide?
f3) C '.That remedy the parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure
the disease of the commonwealth, and (4) D The true reason of the
remedy." It will be seen that the m.aior premise of the syllogism is
contained in (1), and the minor premise in (2), ("), and f4]. The
discussion accordingly falls under those heads.
I. The Common law. fl!ajor Premise.)
A. "Vi'hat ’.7as the Common Law Before the Linking of the Act?"
I. Restraint of Trade.
Classification of Restraints oT Trade. In the -lead i no- English case
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of Iv'itchel V. Reynolds, 1 T. 7ras . 191, decided in 1711, Parser 0. J.
carefully analyzed restraints of trade, conaiderinr tbe^n ss '’•olnntary
or involuntary. The involuntary restraints are historical irmcr-
tance only, since they rest in g-eneral on ancient custom and net on
the contract relationship, which is essential in the modern applica-
tion uf the doctrine. The arrangement of voluntar’- restraints made
by Justice Parloer, hov;ever, is still recognized as fundamental in the
law today. The classification is as follows:
±, involuntary restraints.
a. Grants or charters from the Crown.
ii. new charter of incorporation to trade generally (in the
city of London). This si void, as ’’no corporation made
v/ithin time of memory can ha^e such privilege (because of
ancient custom) flyjless it be by Act o^ Parliament.” 9 Co.
121
. (
A grant to particular pers.ns for the sole ey.ercise of any
kno'.vn trade. This is void, because it is a monopoly and
against the policy of the common law and llagna Charta.
11 Co. 94.
A grant of the sole use c:' a newly invented art. Th^s is
good because it encourages ingenuity in the trades
.
b. Restraints by custom.
Those which are for the benefit of some particular persons
who are alleged to use a trade for “'he adx’’antage a com-
munity are good. 9 Co. 125. 2 Bulst. 195.
'Those which are for the benefit of a community of per-=ons
who are not alleged but are suppose'’ to use •‘•h® ‘^'rade in
order to e:xclude foreigners are good . 9 Go . 121 This
. h.
vy»
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nas abolished by St . 5 ai]d 6 ’V , IV. c. 76 s. 14.
A custom may be pocd to restra-'n a trade ir a particular
place thcu{^h none aro ever suppcsed or allep-ed to us^ it.
c. Hestraints of traie bv by-lavrs.
Those ezcludiur fcrei^-uers are ^oc 1 if merely to eu'l^orce a




^^11 by-lav/s made t^. cramp trade in general aro void.
By-laiV3 made to rostra'; n trade for the better gcvernment and
regulation of it aro good, if they are for the benefit the
place; to avoii public inconvenience, etc.; and are for f'-e
advantage of the trade. Paym. 293.
Voluntary Hestraints. "
a. General restraints. There are all void, v^hether by bon/'’,
vyith or without cons iderat ion
,
and ’whether it bo the party’s
own trade or net, which is restrained.
b. Particular restraints.
If without cons iderat ion
,
even these restraints are void,
7/here a contract for restraint of trade appears ’:c ’’'o ma^'e
upon a good and adequate consideration, so as to ma'''e 1 a
proper and useful contract, it is good.
Perhaps a more useful classification of voluntary restraints is
the following:
Voluntary Hestraints,
a. Trade of one of the parties restrained.
If limited in regard to the time or place, such a contract
is good.
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b. Trade o another restrained, i. e., a contract to restrain,
not In restraint trade.
If the parties liave no brsiness O"^ their OT7n of tl^at natnre,
the contract is bad, as t’ne justification of promoting* anoth-
er trade is v7antin£, and it is done malicious Ip
.
if tiie natural, and expected result is to restrain another's
trade, but for the benefit of t’^eir own, an 1 bp lawful
Laeans
,
the contract is rood, as it nromotes one trade as much
as it injures another.
If unlav/ful means are used, the contract is alwaps bad.
Restraint of Trade Pounded on Public Tol icy. The law restraint
of trade is in every case that of public policy. In this reg-ard
,
Kekewich J. said in the case of Davies v. Davies, 5 Ch . Div.
"All authorities from first to last, concur in one thinr,-~viz. that
the doctrine on this subject is founded on public nolic 3% and I cannot
but regard t}ie jarring c};)inions as exemplifying the well -known doc-
trine of ivlr. Justice Burrough in Richardson v. Idellesfe, 2 Bing. 229
,
that public policy is a very unruly horse, and v;^en once you ret astrid®
it, you never know where it v/ill carry you. Public policy does net
admit of definition, and is not e?;Slly explained." "One t’'’"ng I
I
take to be clear, an 1 it is t’nis that public oolicy is a varia'^^le
quantity, that it must vary, and does vary with the habits, capacities
and opportunities of the public."
it was inevitable that as time went on, the judicial attitude
toward restraints of trade should shift. The early policy o^ England
was to encourage trade by every means, artificial or natural, and t’^us
to build up a nation of traders. To rain this end in early times,
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rig^orous rule that contracts in r^ctrainl cf trade wore voi-i, was
countenanced. In the course of the industrial and economic devel-
opment of the countrj^, however, a more liberal view was adopter’,
since the courts beg-an to lock differentl:* at t’-e ouesticn: '’’7hat con-
tracts restrain trade?'' V/hen the avenues trade and employment were
impeded by artificial policies, so that no occupaticn wss open to t^e
workman except his trade, any agreement restraining- that trade ma'^e
him neeless to the community, but 7/ith greater freedom of the indiv-
idual came the idea that all such contracts were not necessarily in-
jurious, Schrainka v. Scharringhaus en . V/hen the orifina"! doctrine
was evolved, means of communication were scanty anl the oconom'c li-^'e '
of the obligor was restricted tc h1s own cemmunity. With the inven-
tion of the railv;ay, the telegraph, and the telephone, f^e possibili-
ties cf economic efficiency increased to a remar''''a‘hl e derree, and
where the individual as an industrial unit hat '^ormerly been con’^’ined
to one locality, ho nc7/ might exercise a naticnw'de in-'^luer-e nyc'- t^e
business of the country. Under these conditions, public policy mue+
nec«;ssarlly be a variable c^uanttty, since a state in an agricultural
or trading era must have different needs when it reaches a mianufaetur-
ing or industrial stare cf development.
Objections to Restraint of Trade
.
In Ilitchel v. Reynolds, supra,
four reasons were given by Parker C, J. why contracts in restra'nt o^
trade were contrary to public policy and presumed to be bod: 1. In
favor cf trade and industry. 2
.
Because mischief nlainl’’ appears,
but the benefit, if any, can only be presumed, and in that case t’-'e
presumptive benefit is overcome by apparent mischie-^. 7>
,
Because the
mischief is not only private, but public. 4. It is presumably of n o
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4jury to the public, every ere is affeete^. thereby.
lE an early Llassachuset ts case, Alfrer Vi Thatcher, 19 Pic"''. 51,
such contracts were considered injurious to the parties ma^inp them,
"because they diminish their means of procurinr livelihoed-- or com-
petency i’or their families; they tempt improvident persons, '"or ^he
sabe of present gain, to deprive themselves of the power to ma>e fu-
ture acquisition, and they expose such persons to imnes it ’ ons and
oppression; they tend to deprive the public of the services O"^ men in
the eroployments and capacities, in which they may be most useful to
the community as well as to themselves; they discor.rage industry and
enterprise, and diminish the product of ingenuity and s’-'iH; t’^'ey
prevent cempetitien and enhance prices; they expose the public to all
the evils of monopoly. All this Is especially applicable to- wealthy
companies and large corporations which have f^e means, unless restrain-
ed by law, to exclude rivalr;/, monopolize business, and engross tb»
raarbet. Against evils libe this, wise laws project individuals and
the public by declaring all sucli contracts void."
The light in which the state regards contracts in restraint of
trade was succinctly stated in the case of Oregon Steam; Eavigaticn Co.,
V. ITinsor, 2C V/all . 64. There the court said that contracts in re-
straint of traie are bad for two reasons: first, the public is depriv-
ed of the industry' of the restricted parties and therefore su-^-^ere--
injury; secondly, the party himself is injured by beinr preclu'^ed from
pursuing his occupation, and thus supporting himsel-^ and h-’s '^amily.
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7Historical Development of Reatraintp cf Tra-le, It wm 3 decile '"I as
early as the reig-n of Henr^; V that a ccrtract impcsi’^r a g-orf^ral re-
straint of trade is void. Hull J. is said to have flov;--; into a
passion at the very sipht cf a bend containing- such a conditicn and to
have said: "A ma intent vous poures aver der.nrre snr Iny cue 1 ’obliga-
tion est vS)ide eo que le cendition est encounter le ccrnrr.cr luy, e"’’ p*r
Dieu, si le plaintiff fuit icy, il irra al prison tanoue i,l ust ’^ait
fine au Roy.” 2 Hen. V. fo. 5, pi. 25. for f'''e next ^e-.v centuries
restraints were considered feneral if unlimited “it^-er i
time or place. t'’-Qrthermore
,
ti-^ cens-? dpra"’- -i rn v7rp s-^r-’ctl-'^ exam-ined
during- this period an d the rule 7/as -^"old cue t’'G''- i must be a-'^erua-’-'*
to the restraint. This vzas course " •”'’1 cud + o " '^eterm-' nat Ic n an-^
g-ave rise to conflicting decisions, since any suc>^ ruest^'en a^’f^cnacy
must necessarily be dependent upon the economic an'' social opinion^
the presiding justice. 3c strict was the rule in '’avor q-’’ +h» -free-
dom of trade and contract that all contracts' were presum-^d ba'"!
until something further appeared in -^’avor ’>e cbiigcf^ than mere
fact that the restraint was partial. In order to overcome thn’s pre-
sumption, the entire circumstances o*’ the case W''r'' ’o ’’p exar'i'^ed,
and judgment was given on *he +hen in3e:^inite test O'” reasena'’-] cress
,
as applied to these circumstances.
Such was th-e state of. the English common law at f^e tinn the
iimerican Revol^ition. Since then, hcv;ever, the changing economic cen-
flitions have resulted in -^ar-reaching me d i-^i cat ions o'” the original
doctrine. In 18S7
,
Eitc’^cocb v. Cclter, 6 A S E 4S4, dl--’ awa’" with
the rule demanding inquir” into the su^-^iciency c” ’’-^e --’cns idera'’' ion .
Since that case was decided -^’--ere has been not'-'-ihg neculiar ^o con-

\tracts in restraint of traie in re£-ard to requirements con? iierat ion
;
the rules of other contracts apply, and a ccnsi i^rat ion such as
would he hindinf- upon the parties in an ordlnar^’ cc’^tract, is suf-^ic-
ient sc long* as it is net colcrahle merely. At about *>'•'.? time it he-
came definitely settled tha^ if a covenant is in any way limi'^ed,
either sufficiently as regards space, cr as regards time, then will
not he considered as an absolute restraint of trade, hut cnl^ as a
limited restraint, where the cuesticn of the reasonableness o^ the
limitation hecemes pertinent. Davies v. Davies 3 Ch . Div . 359.
In 1343, Llallan v. I.lay, 11 Id L 7/ 653, the rule in regard to tbe pre-
sumption that all contracts in restraint of trade are had, was still
held to he the same as in Iditchel v. Reynolds. This n^le gradually
changed, hev/ever, in the tiext fev/ ,lecad,es
,
and in 1337 Cotton X. J.
said of it in Davies v. Davies: ’’That I think has been modified to this
extent, that the presumption is not that such a covenant is hai, hut




The present Rngll'^h doctrine as tc limitation time or space
is as follows: When the restraint is general, i. e. witv-out rualifica-
tion, the contract is held eo ipso unreasonable an.'-'’ cortrar*’- ‘"O pub-
lic policy. When it is partia'^, i. e. subiect to seme ^ uali cat t on
either as to time or space, then its reasonableness must he considered.
In this question, a . tention -is especially paid to •"he limits time
and space set forth, and the protection of the trade the covenantee,
this latter point involving not only the na'^rure and exten"- ""^e
trade hut including the application c-"’ imnroved facilities in mea’^? of
transportation and communication.
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It has teen said that the American doctrine in refard tc restraint
of trade as eratodied in the comrnrn law of the states has chanp-ed little
from the original English common law at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, This is not ."justif iatle in recent year§ j thcurh it ma""
te that the law in this country has net been medifie] sc much as in
England. It 7/as undoubtedly true until the decades immediately
follov/ing the Civil V/ar, and it must have been true in the order
fhings
,
because the Ti'nited States had net yet reache’ stame
industrial development which was ’ ns tn:mental in 'Hrinrl^r a'^cu'^ ^’-^e
cnange in the law of .-.hgland. Since 13~C
,
’'’cwevcr, f''e enormous
increase in facilities or all i^'irds has chanp’e^ ‘’"C economic i ^e of
this country cmch as that of Englan ’ ha.l been changed a shert tim.e
before, and with this rapid development came an ecua’’ ly rapid modifi-
cation of public policy./ as applie'’ to restraints ^rade. 3'ence
it is better to say that the Amr rican common la™ changed later than
the English common law, but that by 1B9C they were anurcuims'^elu t’-^e
same
.
Llodern Requisites of Valid Restraints. 1, contra<'-'^ must be
pai’tial. As long as some Idmitaticn either as tc time or place appear
the rule against general restraints is satisfied. The contract may
be divisible, being valid as to one part and invalid as to another,
under this rr.le. Eor example, in the case o the covenant no^ *c
caryy on the business of brewer in 3 or elsewher'^'
,
^or a period of ten
years, it was held that the condition might be good ss to 3, but was
bad as to the rest. Einde v. Grey 111 L Gr. 195.
2, The cox]s iderat ion must be adequate. At present, adecuacy
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Vthe same rules of ecus iderat icn apply as in ether cases in the law o'^
contracts.
5. The restraint rnr^st be reascnable. Tindal 0. J. in Horner v.
Graves, 7 Sing. 724 says: "'.Ve do not see how a better teS" can be
applied to the question, wheti.er reascnable or not than by considcrjng
whether the restraint is such only as to afford a fair protection to
the interests of the party in favor of whom it is given and not sc
large as to interfere v/ith the interests of the public. ’.Vhatever
restraint is larger than the necessary protection ‘^.hc parties re-
quire, can be of n" benefit to them, it can only be oppress i'^e’, an'’ i" f
pi:>press ive
,
it is in the eye of the law unr^asenab'^ e , ’fhatev^-r ’’s
injurious to the interests of the pi^blic is voi'’, on 'rhe groun-’s of
public policy.’’ It appears then, that three elements enter into tte
question of reasonableness: first-, injury to the party resti-ained;
secondly, injury to the ir:blic; thirdly, use to the obligee.
American Cases on Restraints of T rade. In the case of a contract
not to sell mattresses in the state of Hew Yor> v;est Albanj^, it
y/as held that this was too large a territory, as not being necessary
to the reascnable protection of the plainti:’’f. Lawrence v. Hidder,
1C Baob. 641.
The state is in any case too large a territerj^. Pelt^ v.
Sichell 62 IIo . 171. Lean v. 3'"'erson 1C2 Mass. 49C .
This rule is one of reason, however, and not c place, and must
accordingly be applied v/ith care. Oregon Steam navigation Co. v.
V/insor.
Contracts including a town and other territory arc "ivisible in
the United States as well as in England. Pelt% v. Eichell supra.
The rules in regard to +^
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business protected by a patent. Llcrse Twist Lrill S. tlachl^e Co. v.
ilorse, 1C3 I'ass . 73. '
The follov;ine- restraints have been held to be valid:
^ct to sell liquor on certain premises in mantit^ es less than -^ive
£-allons, Sul ton v. Head. S6 Ky . 156.
Hot to manufacture ochre in certain county. Smith's Appeal, 113 Pa.
St. 579.
Hot to carry on a trading* business cn certain premises. Ilorris v.
Hf. Co. S3 ^la. 565.
Hot to sell sand from certain premises. He Ip e v. Sloan 1*^7 H. Y. 244.
Hot to sell a particular line poods in a c'^rtain town. Clar''' ,
Crosby 37 It. 153.
Hot to sell to any in a certain town except to the promisee. Hewell
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1 . I.'-onopcli(*s .
Class ificat icn cf I.loncpolieg . Strictly spca’ri’^f, mcMopclir>s O't'
>
corarncn lav? were in every case dependent upon a grant f’rom t}',e sover-
eign. In later times, hewev'-r, both in rlngland and the Tnited States,
the term monopoly v/as e^epanded to cover combinations and other opera-
tions resulting in suppression of cempetitien; and the necessity ^cr a
franchise gradually disappeared in the customary application o'^ the
term. Accordingly, in any me lorn enumeration of the currer."*: types of
moncpcly, net only must the historically accurate class ificat ion of
monopolies by franchise be given, but present-day industrial combina-
tions as well.
1. Iloncpolies by franchise.
a, Mediaeval franchises. These accompanied the Ilanor system
frankfold and park, warren and piscary, smithy an 1 bakehouse, mill
and in- rket, ?it;iv/alt ers Case, 3 Keb
.
242. In the towns, th« tradinr
and craft guilds were also rncnci^ciies of this sort. Fri^emantle v.
Silk Throwsters, 1 Lev. 229.
'b. Patents cf monopoly. These were originally instituted to-
wards the end cf the sixteenth cent'-ry as a method o^ encouraging new
enterprises and large industries, but soon began tc be "^^elt as a
great burden, when the ordinary trades and commodit’es v/ere grante'"
in this v/ay as rewards tr court fauror j tes . Case of Ilcncpolies, 11
Coke 34 b.
c. Llodern franchises. The test of the validity t’'e fran-
ehiee in modern times is the sa'^ety or interest of the public. Thus
the followint purposes unifcrmally justify t’ne creation of grants of
this sort by legislative bodies:
/ -' '; f
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Cleaning" cf streets, etc. In re Vanlire 6 Pic-^. 1B7
.
Slaughtering of animals. Boyd v. Montgomery 117 Ala. 677.
Public safety.
Sale of liquor. Lov/enstein v. Pvans 5^' Pel. 908.
Fiduciary businesses. People v. San Francisco 100 Gal. 605.
Skilled employments. The State r . V/ilccx 64 Pan. 799
.
Public institutions.
Schools’. Bancroft v. Thay'^r 5 ’7aT7y. 500.
Public V7orkr. Verdin v. St. Louis I'^l Mo* 56.
Public services.
Transportation. V/ccd v. Seattle 05 '7ash. 1.
Public utilities. People v. People's Gas Lighi etc. Co.
205 111. 492.
2. Monopolies by supvressicn of competition,
a. Barly forms of moncpclin-at ion .
Forestalling the market. This consisted of buying up nec-
essaries on their V7ay to market, or of contracting lor the control
of anything coming tc?/ard the market, or even of holding out in-
ducements to prospective sell'-rs to raise- their prlccp or vithhold
their commodities from market. Botelor v. 7/ashirgton 2 Cranc^ C.
G. 676.
Regrating. This ccnv=isted bnj^ing necessavi^s they
were in the m rket
,
with intent ^o sel] f^em In' same mar''''et at
an advanced pric*^, or even contract ^cr
goods in advance cf the market, with like Intent. Rex v. Rushy
2 Peake IT. P. 189.
.: .->)
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En^rrcssinf the mar>et. The h’^yirir neces.’^erieF at r’.ar''’-cts
or elsewhere with intent to sell afair, anl especiall:/ rnuch hnriTip
of this sort with snch intent cons t i tiitel the offence. P.cv. v.
I^aynard, Gero. Car 231.
Consxiiracies against trade. ^’rora earliest tir.es, several
cornhined tc control trade or advance prices, it r/as a sericns c^-
fenco v/heth’er actual injury resulted cr net. Anon. 1? I'cd. 243.
t). licdern forms of monopolisation. At the present time in'^us-
trial combinations for the -purpccc suppressing cemnetitien are
usually efi'oeted hy one of those devices;
Tools. Swift V. United States, 196 U. 3. 375.
License cr lease-. Oliver v. Gil.mcre, 52 Fed. 562.
Trusts cr similar devices. Ccula v. Head, 33 Fed. 336.
Holding corperat iens . Hcrthern Sccuri t i es , Co . v. Uni'I’ed
States 193 U. 3. 197.
Sense lidat ing corporations. HcCutcheon . 7oiz Capsule Co.
71 Fed. 737, Centra, Trenton Potteries Co. v. Cliphant,
53 H. J. Eii. 507.
Public Policy in I.Ioncpc lies . In many respects the same reasons hold
for the abolition of mcncpoli es
,
as ao-ly ir. the case o'^’ restra'rts
trade. As distinguished from restraints of trade, hrwev»“r, it t s the
public alone who suffer on account of the rise prices, det ''riorat i on
of the article, exclusion of the public at larg*^, tog'“t'-er 7'i+’- limita-
tion of production, wh.ich monepely necessarily implies. Or account
of this connotatio-'
,
there has been for several centuyies in f-e Anglo-
Saxon mind a repugnance for monopolies as a relic cf t' e times w’^^en
franchises were promiscuously given as perquisites o-^ court •’ers. In
mm
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the v;orQs of Justice Story: "V/hen it is once sup-g-ested tha1 a praut is
of the nature or tendency of a ncnopoly, the mind almost instantaneously
prepares itself to reject every construction which does not pare t
down to the narrowest limits. It is an honest prejudice which p-r'^w
up in former times from the gross abuses cf t^e royal prerorat ves
,
to tTtich in America there are no analogous au'^’^crit ies . "
’’All grants of this l:ind relating to any >ncwn trade are male
void the common law, as being arainst "he '^reedem cf "-ra-^®, '"’Is-
couraging labour and industry, restraining persous? i’rcm an
honest livelihood by a lawful emulo 7'm.ent , an'"’ putting it in tv^ power
cf particular persons to set v/hat prices t’’e 7" please on a comm^'^ 1
all of which are manifest incenven iencos tc the public.” Haw‘'-®s T. 0.
c. 79, P 2. Those guilty cf rnonopc lir: ing at common law w-^re subject
tc fine and imprisonment, the offence being censid red malum in se,
and "centrary to the ancient and fundamental laws the r.p-'-'’ err. .
3 Inst. 161.
The fundamental idea cf the common law c mcnoucly is ^ou'^'^ in
the Case cf lioncpclies
,
11 Co . 34 b . The question of a grant o'^ ti-e
exclusive privilege cf making playir.g carls within "he limits
kingdom being in issue, it v/as held a mrnopcly and against the common
law for four reasens: (1) -all trades by whic>^ men maintain themselves
and increase their substance are profitable for the coramon wel'^are,
and therefore the grant of sn exclusive privilege in one o"’ t^em 's
against the common law inasmuch as 1t 's a restr’’ ct ion lib^r^ur.
(2) A mono pc ly is a prejudice tc all subjects, ^cr "v-o-pA are thr^e
inseparable incidents to every monopcl:^: fa) the price the cemmo-







•' * * I* • i
.. ^v'r, £*> ^jgir/v;. 4‘i‘-s'.^ OJf £raj2*r®<i






















•Jt '^a ^:tin’rr >iM i)^ £ili 1 ^:rkJf3^ ib
,% : ’••• -^. ‘ ' - |M. ‘»‘ . . ^ ' ' -*•* .
^;n-^rir3at;..§b.4 h^btf tid'W* d ‘Optin'-












• rro^ r.riB f»oHBcredu8 Ttrai^u











^ tbi- r,fB r>^
©H-f i»V :"'-’'B'3ffO't0‘^. ; Vft«'0^_ q.trfiffifo^r ©X‘Cfa^3(jS3Jtt^
'
-
' ' />-'.*,--'-•'> ' ' ^ ;«5 - - - ’ •-'*
*’“-'
..-" / ' ’ -
r» «fX r^ '^*tXi3'br®'c»Vv ^ tf V, e.7 ;; 'i^X.
chantatle as before; fc) it. tenls to tVe impoy^risbrrent 0 - 1“ ^y. -
cluled. (3) Tne ciieen '.vas deceived ir her frart, *^or the prant rec-’"
es that it v/as for the rublie weal. (4) The ^rant was prirna Irr.-
pressicris without authcritp cf law or reason. It will be noticed
that the ar£uments upon which most stress is laii tcdap are under 'P):
the price is raised, the com-cditv is li^rely to det^riora^** , and the
.'nohcpclp is like Ip to canse hardship to t^csP' having- no interest n it.
History of L'cncpo li es . The unpopularity of mcncpolios is not peculiar
to English law. The objocticns to it rest on underlying prircipli"S
maintained for the encouragenent of trade and commerce, whic^ have been
favored by all peoples. In Greece, by the laws c"^ Athens, the prac-
tice of exporting corn or even of socrotinr or herding it up was pun-
ishable by death. Lypsiae centra Gardanarios oraticnem., Among the.
Homans offences against trade were els sed as extraordirr- ry cri' es
against which nc special law was enacted, yet which as off’ences arai-^st
the republic were punishable in the discretion cf maris trateg
,
even by death: raising the prices of provisions, and s^llinc-'by
false weights an 1 measures, wer^ especially cendemned. Ey the Julia’-'
la^.
,
whoever conspired to raise the price cf vitnals, such as corn,
cil, bread, meat, salt, etc., whether bj? detention cf vessels, sub-
traction or suppression cf prcvisicf-s, or by other similar malpractices
was severely fined. a11 fraudulent acts cf the Praefecti Annobae, the
magistrates v;ho had in charge the regulation of propulsions, were pun-
ishable under this statute. Aden, elementa juris civilis, p. 796.
Among the Swedes and Goths, nc purchase could take place except before
witnesses, tind this not merely tc insure evidence of the t ransact i on
,
but in order that the purchaser aho^Jld be able tc buy the commeditj? at
jy||;t',r^vA ,t‘a? q.-; o
,
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n’ a reascnatle sum. Stiernh. de iure 3uee . et Gctho v«stiisto. c. 5.
l.lauy regulations were in effect among the Saxons in ^.ngland, and
afttrr them under the Anglo, Danis-
,
and ITorman kings, all for th“ nur-
i^ose of obtaining free and open traffic. j?'rom.the times of Lothario
p) ® and Zdric, kings of Lent, and Ina, king of 'Yessex, to the period of
the Conquest, scarce a reign elapsed without some enactment for these
purposes. Throughout the greater part of this period. It was the law
that no ]perscn should hup, sell, bargain for, or exchange any cattle,
clot-h or other commodity, except in the public mar''’ret, in the nest
frequented and open part, and befcre_wi tresses ’"ith nn'^
warranty. By the lav;s of Lthelstan all sales articl<=*s at'C'^e the
value of 20 pence had to be nad“ publ-!clg; under these of Canute, all
above 4 pence; and und--r the regulations of .-^ethelred th*^ nurcha?=' '*rs
of cattle or sheen 7/ere obliged to preserve the head and hi-e '^cr three
days before they sold them.. These lav;s were enacted nc"*: cnl:^ to pro-
mote publicity and suppress fraud, but in acccrda -ce wi'l-v a well-de-^in-
ed policy which declared that fairs and nr rk<»ts shoul'’ be replenished
and furnished with all sorts of commodities.
This policy r/as cbr.tinued in later times and num' rous statutes'^
v/ere enacted by the ""lantagenets ^nd Tudors for the purpose of foster-
ing trade and commerce. nmong these statutes t?/o are especially pro-
minent: 2 L 3 Ldv/. YI . c. 15 summarized and collected previous statutes
-^tcf. 23 Sdw. Ill, c 6; 6 Rich. II, c lO ; 11 Rich. II, c 7; 1 Hen . lY, c
13; 14 Een. YI
,
c 6; 25 Hen. YIII, c 2; 2 £3 Rdv/. YI, c 21; 5 P. 6 3dw.
|| ^ YI, c 14; 5 Bliz. c 5 I 12; 13 Dliz. c 13; 21 Ja. I, c 22; 2 £ 3 p &











.«•.•, ..r _> ii-'./'in.J *''». -C • »: . -.W
f :- T-» ^ r/ . nl '.
^
-
' ij >'(? V
^,'F *.-'
'X 'f ' ‘!7'i*^ I ' tt''' ‘ * i '1
*4j <
' ^ * «-T|d
^
* t ' ^
I
*
8jr*«'"’<f‘?-*)cr «fi.+ ' Hi!'- . _
?r
^PdOIL 3*. 'aV^
;r '-^4 <«7r.+« s^:;ro,f'.i:-t« era, a^fi* rite " .|rf«a.-ira.w'>





. \ ^ J j|
^'iTa
,
'fi trrjfsD • ,‘ '’’’-J- ’ f<ff. 07
'
f'^ff i>o,(T9e
































-o-fo^vv’j.r’iit.o pw;? ..io*i.;fina-oo hne 3iti^
on the subject to tVie effect that ccmMnat i' ns arnonr vi ctiiall-^rs or
artificers to raise the price of prcvisicns or "^ho rates wares
were unlawful. runishment was by fine an "i imoris onrr.ent "^cr ^’^e '"irst
offence, fine ani the pillory for the seccn'^, an<i fine an'’ loss an
ear for the third. The Statute of Ifcncpcljes SI Ja. I c. f, h}/ a
general clause demolished all existing mcncpciles, with certain excep-
tions, and declared them to he contrary to the ]ar; and void. Among
the exceptions were included all grants under acts of Parliament, pa-,
tents granted for a lim.it '! tim; 0
,
m.cncpclies as to printlnr. an'-’’ as to
certain manufactures and materials useful in war.
All these statutes were repealed hy 12 Geo. III. c, 71. After
this time however monepelies were still- prosecuted st common law until
1B44 7/hen 1 i. 8 Vic. c. 24, declared that this entire body of law had
been done away with, thus marbing a new sta.^o in the industrial de-
velopment cf England. Practically all that is new left of this -nert
of the common law is tlic law against "corners’’, i. e., securing such
control of the imm.doiate supply of any product as to enable these cpi*r-
ating the "corner" to advance the price of the product arbitrarily. Sx
parte Young, 6 Biss. 54. The gist cf 'his offence, however, is in
the conspiracy involved; tlie individual may control as mnic'- o'’ ^he
market as he is able unless it is done by unlav/ful means, as by
gambling contracts. Rex v. Eilbers, 2 Chittj' 163.




A grant, commission, cr franchise from the sovereign author-
ity.
2, A certain, definite grantee who
or a corporation.
3. exclusive privilege, usually
may be a person or persons
the sole buying, well-
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ing-, making, working or us inf of something.
4. The public in freneral is restrained “®rom some fre^^dcm or
liberty enioyed before; that is, restrained ^.'rom following trades, pur-
suits or callings there-tc-fore free and open to all.
From this enumeration o'’ the elements of a monopclr, it a-r^pears
that only common law monopolies have the necessary characteristics to
permit analysis into these parts. Under •. his type cf monopoly there
are in *.he united States only patents, and grants '^rom legislative
bodies for public and cuasi-public purposes. A.11 other so-called
monopolies are more nearly analagcus to restraint? o*' trade. As the
modern idea cf monopoly, however, is so deep'’.y rooted in th'=» lay as wold
as the legal mind, it is necessary to define it in terms ot’-'er than
those historically accurate. le at present there is much opinion
and some authority for the proposition that magnitude alone is able to
constitute monopoly, the prevalent definition includes suppress ic’^ cf
competition by un i ‘'icat ir n cf interests or manacrerent, or throup-’- agree-
ment and concert of action. In t’-^e Tobacco Case, 154 Fed. ’’•'OO, tha
court said that a monopoly in its present sense eTcists when as a re-
sult of efforts to that end, previously competing businesees are sc
centered in the hands of a single person or cerporatier, or a -^‘-w
persons and corporations acting together, that they ha'^e power practi-
cally to control the prices cf commodities and thus practically to
suppress competition. Careful exaninat irn of the apparently con-
flicting opinions as to the present status and constitut'^on s
monopoly, however, seem to "'ead to this conclusion: that the elements
of common lew mcnopelies are still present, with '•xc^pt ^ the
first, nariely, the grant or franchise from the sovereign, wh-ieh has
.-V ^ To -'arei.f to , 'srii'i^-Tan. ,5ifc
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disappeared in the course of shifting econor.ic ccnditi'^ns. "'•ith
the exception of this requisite, modern forms monopoly sc “^ar
as can he determined from the ad.iudgod case§, have in every case
t’/70 fundamental elements eraphasi.zed at common law. There is in every
case an exclusive right or privilege on the one hand an an exclusion
from certain existing benefits on the cth=r. It will he seen in
the analysis of any monopoly in the modern sense, that t’-^'s distinction
holds true: the industrial organism constituting a mcncpoly secures the
exclusive privilege hy means of suppression of ccmpetiticr. an"! other
devices; at the same time it excludes the ordinary, individual ^rcm
the privileges which it enioys. The teat of competition sc often
promulgated is found under this definition to he secondary only.
Suppression c competition amounts to no more than a means whereh-'’ a
certain result, namely, the en;]*cyment of an exclusive privilege,
attained. Eence. it is, that the emphasis should net he on the
suppression of competition, hut on that which suppression of cempoti ticu.
generallj^ implies, namely, the exclusive privilege.
*
II, The Sherman Act. fllinor PremiBe.)
£. "V/hc.t vvad tile miachief an 1 defect apalnat v/hich he common law
did net orovide?”
Absence of Common Law in Federal Law, At the time of the adoption
of the Constitution the common alv; recog-nized on this side of the
Atlantic v/as the common lav/ of Cng-land together with the precedents
v/iiicii had grev/n up in the colonies. It v/as therefore a common lav/ of
the separate states and v;as often quite different in one from v/hat it
was in another, ov/ing to the fact that even at fehat earlj/ period the
English common lav; had been modified in the various colonies to suit
their particular needs. There w/is
,
then, no one bod"^’ of unv/ritten
law v;hich, at the time the Fedei'al government was established, pasRed
in its entiret:/ from the colonies as a whole to t’-^e nation. Eac>"
individual state retained its ov/n disti’^ct corpns juris, ?rantinr and
delegating to the national rovernment certain do'f'''nite powers v/’-'ich
were enumerated in th^ Constitution, Those grants of nowers v/ere
specific. L'o v/ider application of them v;as or is nermissihle f^an
is necessary in order to secure their proper adm^ini s t rat ic'^ . Unless
the po.ver therefore is specified in the Constitution t’-^ere can he no
question of the ability of the federal government to interfere.
The situation amounts to this: The Unitest States as a distinct sov-
ereignty has no common law of its ov;n
. In any given case, unless
Congress in pursuance oT a power granted to it under the Constitution,
has made provision f6*r the subject-matter at bar, by general or partic-
ular legislation, it must be said that the United States as such has
no lav; on the matter involved.
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under the jurisdiction cf^the United States, are enunorate-1 in ^he
Judiciary Acta of 1739 and the Grimes Act of A^ril SO, 179C . U. 3.
Rev. 3t. Title LXX. Under these Acts an '1 under bthers which extend
their application, the common law of the United States? is iri civil
cases the common law cf the particular state from w’-ic’^ t^e ruestion
comes to t’-^e federal court, fU . 3. Rev. St. Sec. 721), hut ever in suc’*^
cases the United States has no U 7;rjt'er: civil law as an cr;g-inal jur-
isdictioh, since the law is made.-^’cr it acccrdinf^ to the individual
case arising under the individual State common lav/. In criminal cases,
there is no common law of the United State? whatever, since t^'e crim-
inal law cf the states is not recognized as af'^ec'^inr i'e-'leral c'^fences .
Swift et al. v. R. R. Co. 64 Fed. 59. U.3. v. 17orrall ? Dali. 5B4
.
The subject of restraints of trade and mononolie? was not mentioned in
the Crimes .-xct
,
nor in anj^ subsequent act until the Sherman Act
July 2, 1B9C. Accordingly there was no criminal law in this regar'-’’ in
the United States until the passage of the Act; and the nnstitutlon
civil suits by the government against monopolies was "ot practicable
because no one body of law was available. Although the cuestion has
never arisen, it is probable that under its pov/er to regulate trale and
commerce the United States might ha^^e int^r'^er*d in a civil cas-^ where
a monopoly or restraint c-^ trade was '*nw’’olved, an^ controlled t^e
offending company to some extent b 7* empoly’nr ' lav/ oS t>e s'''at«s i^^
which the monopoly or restraint was cc’^dnr'ted, yet in an:/ case such
control must necessarll:/ '^lave heen ' nc d'^ntal oni”, since
question were raised '^or Its own sa'*e, there was unt il t’-^e Sherman Act
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the suit was successfully prosecuted. T^-e Sherman A ct , then, made it
possible for the United States to institute prcceedinps apeinst trusts
and mcncpclies as it had heretcfcro not been able to do.
Conditions requirinp Legislation as to Restrain ts and I'icnopc lies
.
There was no mention of the subject in the Judiciary Acts nor in the
Crimes Act for the simple reascn that a condition of affairs which
would necessitate control of trusts and monopolies was net contemplated.
ri.t the time of this legislation, the United "tates was as yet in “'he
agricultural ai.d trading stage of development. Business enterprises
were conducted by individuals, and the partnership was the most ccm.-
plicated form of industrial cembinatien then existing. It was net
until approximately a half century later that th>s ccuntrv can ho
said to have become far advanced in tv-’o manufacturinr stap-e a d eve’^
then business combinations were unhnewn. In the rears ^’cllowinr ‘*'0
Civil V/ar, particularly in the '70’s and 'SC's, remarkable progress
took place in the evolution of cur industrial development. Burlnr
this period, railroads v/ere built with extraordinary rapid means
of communication were greatly improved, and the V.uyiness h.cr'zcn of the
manufac turei-* wav- widely extended. It was inevitable that ~lth
broadening of the range of efficiency In marketing as well as in
production, large enterprises should tend to grow larger still and
leaders of industry should combine with others to control prices and
markets. In the latter part of the 'SC's the spirit of r-embinatien
had increased to such a degree that it was evident that governmental
interference was necessary in order to p rctect the small producer
and the public. The first lerislatlcn along this line was ‘*:>e Inter-
state Commerce Act of 1897. This was directed arainst t’-^e t^en
*r
. ,
to A e-'~ . beiuovao'iq i;'l&e9 3siJt. £i«sv; Jiisd br'a V
tcrrro-^ij ^Atrf’osD jTn e^f^tr^aar o.^, bo?,-?! * ^n’.t olcf : ?.9'^q-
•
.of- Di oltfa r:99d .Mr; f'^u t: B.H 39x1 jqonorr.
.
e^xlo'Torr >L1 eir* r-.-t ?;£?>? o‘t ris no r t s.i:
~
M .• 5i fiflo ^ 1 1 fciioC \r^
f
A-''-* 'Tf n^ci ^joA At-s 'oxbLr', edt nl Joer, dnp. odx :o n'^rloerr;- on b^v eiorlT' *>





Xcjj'"M ‘: o 'Ion Jr.oe Ov3Ji ^i-oo^n bly^w
yi
<»•'* nr t'»v' 3o.*a* od:? , no r ; jlaxi^oX -xidJ 'to omiJ o.iJ J*. ;*'
.Bpsinqna-o no yaonx-B.rrX . Jff9CK( olovsb *lo o'j.stB otfiLanw ..a lani' jXuOxn;^xi
-CToo i-a?; •; r - -non-tn ’<r .-dl . l2 rajjLxvif'.ni :X taxouLaoo 9now ,'d
'
.*00 os’A’ rl .-3f' ' iB X‘j ffoX' M -iJSiiiXrToo latn^Bobsi: ‘i > .tnoT tstaoi^q
•
«'
'»'!'> ’ n.tM.r ,.) •. ; ,ti«r.;,,‘ nc*ar qn;;^ * oo *' fad a vl^iamixoncqa li^oir
f- ii o iii.t^ -nf .' n : * 'vr f> r f^ *^oci3Vi a na* onio’^orf ovxv.' oj fias
o-^* ^'‘ ' t«;oI r D B*r »9*' orit nl .<to oTntr onov.- pnoi ja»(rJ 2:oo co.i*"






'-‘YmT XalntC.ri/ax n;tj *t> nxiXuXov^’ OjfJ ul ooBlq )CooX
*
‘






) t JM 1 ny ,’j'yYj’t''jZL qiJrfan*;) o.ow n ^1 X aoi n.-Qraoo Xo
.''^-
EX ' * ^r' Xi5 ^* r 'a t : V 0 I i; j” .i.:.., i.Xxo vX;iEIv. j=j.. n^iii X i fiBxt ,<
• i
ii ’;B !To\v 3B : -MXTrT.i rtr '<00 o i o t *) ‘1 9 ’ o 9''^oon p.'fJ 10 *';^nX fiof Bond
boa rr:X noM^’T '-t )*r ^ -iX f cir t iluo.i-. eoBxnu'rt: Xao -•^nal , joi X oxxLonq
f ‘.3 SS'f’Jq X •>X BTOiiX.* XiV.' sOiiiuHjO irX.OOuB \,'LJ HiiUili > j oltJuBOX
•
' V
no t * ao 1 X)"’ ' ' o .trnN^B odj a' ‘’'yd.l o;lX Xo xnatr neX.-al rj.ix nl .bXs/Tnas;
f3 :*T«^'«rnv>v 0 XbXX ‘noM vo tia.'v x,r. XaiiX san '^t»n a oJ L&bxsenoai XbA ^
n^oob')n^:/ rTt^rpa '^dt o o' -i* '.rrsBfaoo^n 3£v; aou»nsXnoXfii
“TofoX o'^t ^'C*X pA f' X '^oora ’’ ’ X t r ' t '’.9 1 * sni^ arfX .oi-i'juq s;ix i.>ob ,
'’i .‘tEf'^K'^a F“='toon'f *.x4«» arriX' ' ;708X ‘"t o XoA oonoior^oC »XbXb
prevalent practices cf railroads, -hereby discrimination became 'he
rule and fair competition the exception. Here legislation, however,
was necessary. The railroads were not the only factors in the charge
in economic conditions that was gradually beinr fcrcei by the ’'Cap-
tains cf industry’’. lioncpcli zaticn had berun to he the -oredeminant
characteristic in the production cf =>ta-nle ^emme 1 i t ' es
,
an i It was
evident that national ideals c"^ fair plav and oopcrtu'^lty ^cr the
individual could be preserved only by governmental inter ''erence
.
To this end the Sherman iiCt was passed, operating in effect as a
supplement to the Interstate Commerce act. It strengthened the held
of the government on the railroads, wh'ch had been f’^e especial cb;ie'^t
of the earlier Act, and goi»"p beyond It, strueV directly at the vast
cembinatiens which were then op rating to ccntrcl prcducticr, suppress
competition, and fix mar'k:et prices. It 'was in effect a drag-net tc
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* G. "What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointr>d +c
cure the disease of the 0crnmcn7/ealth . " (Effects. the Act.)
1. The Act and its application.
2e:^t of theSherman Act. Sec. 1. Every contract, comhlnaticn In 'he
form of trust or otherv/ise, or conspirac.y, '‘n restraint of tra-'^.e or
commerce amony the several States, or \7ith fereifn natic’^'S, is hereby
declared to be illegal. Every person 'vhe shall mahe any suc^ contract
or engage in any such combination or conspiracy, shall be punished by
fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment nc^^ ex-
ceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the 1^'screticn c-^
the court.
Sec. 2. Every person v;hc shall mcncpclicc, or comhine or con-
spire ivith any other person or persons, to moncpclice any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or v/ith foreign nations,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding t-icusan’t dollars, or by
imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said y)unishm^ nt
~ ,
in
the discretion of the court.
Sec. 3. Every co'ntract, combination in ^orm cf trust or ot'-'er-
wise, or conspiracy, in restra-i'it cf trade cr commerce in. any Terri-
tory of the United States or of the District of Columbia, or in re-
straint cf trade or ccramerce betv7een an 3’ such Terr^'tory and anct’^or, or
between an;/ such Territory cr Territories an.l an;/ State or Spates or th
District of Columbia, cr 'with foreign nations, or between the District
of Columbia and any State or States cr foreign nations, is iieroby de-
clared illegal. Every pt3rson 'who shall mabe an.;/ such contract or en-
gage in any such combination or conspiracy shall be deemed guiltj^ a
misdemeanor, and, on convi 9 ticn thereof, arhall be punished b-’^ fine not
. r
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exceeding- five thcusand dollars, or by imprisonment net exceed inr one
year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of t^e court.
Sec. 4. I’he several circuit courts of the United States are
hereby invested uith jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations
of this act; and it shall be the duty cf the several district attorneys
of the United States, in their ras*iective districts, under directio
of the Attorne' -feneral
,
to institute proceedi’^rs in ei'u-^'t” to prei’-ent
and restrain such violations. Such proccedinc-s may be b-’^ v;av pe-
tition setting- forth the case and praying- that sue’-" viola'^'icn
be en’gcined or other'.7ise prohibited. 7hen the parties complained
shall have been duly notified c^' such petition the court shall pro-
ceed, as soon as may be to the hearing and determination of case;
and pending such petition and before final decree the court may at
any time mabe such temporary res traini’-’g order or prohibition as shall
be deemed just ir the premises.
Sec. 5. "/henever it shall appear to the court before V7hic’^. any
proceeding under section four cf this act may be pending-, that the
ends of justice require that other parties should be brourht before
the court, the court may cause them to be summoned, \7hether they reside
in the district in v;hich the court is held or not; and subpoenas to that
end may be served in any district by the mars’^al '^hereo'^.
Sec. 6. Any property owned under any contract or by any combina-
tion, or pursuant to any conspiracy ( and being tt'ereo^)
mentioned in section one cf this act, a’-’d being in t’^e cours'* trans-
portation from one State to ano’^h'^r, or to a t^oreirn ccuntr:/, s’-^all be
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like proceedin£;:s as those provide'! hp/ lav/ -^or ^orf’eitare, sei.'^nre,
aad cor decr.at ion of property imported into Uni'^ed States oo’"trary
to la'.v.
See. 7. Aby person ’vhe shall he injured :n h's husiness or pro-
perty hy any other person or corperatien hy reason of anything for-
bidden or declared to be unlawful by this act, nay sue therefor in
any circuit court of the United States in the district in w’^ich the
defendant resides or is found, without respect to the amount in con-
troversy, and shall recover threefold t’^e damages by him sustaine',
and the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Sec. 3. That the v;crd ’'x)eracn”, cr "persons”, wherever used in
tliis act shall be deemed to incliide corporations and associations pyist-
ing under or authorized by ti.e lav/s of either the United States, '.he
lav73 of any of tiie Territories, the laws of anv State, or the laws of
any foreign country.
Constitutionality the Act. The pov/ ,r of Congress to deal 7/ith
the question of restraint and mcnopol izaticn i’^^terstat.e commerce
rests on Article 1, Sec. 3 cf the Const itut'^c’^ , "T’-^e Conrress s'^al"
have pc7/er to regulate Commerce witt" varicu? Uatiens and amonm
the several States, and with the In''ian Tribes". Any action t’-'a"’
Congress may take on this subject is necessarily dependent o-' th^s
clause; otherwise ther would be a ccnflict of juri s d: '‘t i between
Federal and State governments. In discussing the application o"^ the
Act, the question of the proper sphere cf crntrcl c'" f’c two uni"^?
government is of prime imp«'rtance, for net only is the power of Con-
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The qiiesoion of the ccnp t itijt icnali ty of the Act was first raised
in the Suprer.e Court in U. S. v. Jo int
.
Traf '*i c Association, 171 II. S.
505, where It vvas ccnteniod: That contracts in restraint cf trade are
not necessarily prejudicial to the security or ’welfare o'" society.
That Congress as without pov/or to prohibi'^ reneral3y all contracts in
restraint of trade, and the effort to do this invalidates the Act in
question. That it is for the court to decide whether t^e tnere fact
that a contract er arrangetnen t
,
whatever its purpose or charact'^r,
may restrain trade in some degree, renders it injurious or pre jv''''icial
to the welfare or security of society, arl if court he t’^«
opinion that such v;elfare or securit:^ is no*^ prejudiced hy a contract
cf that kind, then Congress has no po”’ r to oroT’’ihl* it, t’--' act
must be declared uncons t itut ional . That the act can he snppcrh^'^ onl
as an exercise cf the police pcwnr, and that the or nsti tuti o-^al guar-
antees furnished by the Fifth Amendment to the effect t’^at no per-
son shall he deprived cf life liberty or prepert;'’ withou* due oreccoo
of law, secure to all persons freedom in t’~c pursuit c *heir \’Cca+‘’* 0 ’"
in the use of their property, and in ma'’’'’’rr such contracts or arrange-
ments as nay be necessary therefor. Counsel further urged that
ordinary contracts and conbinat ions
,
which are at he same time most
indispens ible
,
have the effect cf somewhat r-e s t ra n' ng trade and com-
merce, although to a very slig’^t exten'^, and under the C'cstructicn
adopted, must be considered illegal.
DisT) 0 sin£ of the last' point first, the court held t’-'at t^ese
ordinary contracts do not restrain commerce or tra-'^e with'’‘n any legal
definition cf the term, uctlng Hopkins, v. th'” United Ctates, 171 U.'^.
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iniaediate effect is a restraint a-pcn interstate ccm^crce, and that to
»
'v*
treat the act as ccndomnlnp all arreem-nts under ;7hict, as a resnV,
the cost of ccnductinr an interstate ccmr/iercia 1 hnaineas may he in-
creased, V7CU11 enlarge the application of the act far heycncl the ^air
meaning of the lang.uage used. The effect upcn interstate commerce
mnst not be indirect *,r incidental cnl;/.”
Congress has the power v/ith regard to Interstate commerce an" in
the course of regulating it, in the case o'f’ railroad corncraticns
,
to
say that no contract cr ccmbinaticn shall be legal which restrairs
trade and commerce b y shutting out the ope '•at ion of the general law of
competition. ''The business of a railroad carrier is of a public na-
ture, and in performinf it, the carrier is also per'^orming to a cer-
tain extent a function of Lhe government, which, as the counsel observ-
ed, requires them to perform the service upcn equal terms tc all.
This public service, that of transportation of passengers an-'’ freight,
is a part of trade and commerce, and when transported between s'*ates
such commerce boccmies what is described as interstate commerce, and
comes to ^ certain extent, under the Turisdict icn of Ccnrress by vir-
tue of its pew r tc regulate commerce arrenm the several states."
Though the franchise is the prepertr "’'e grantee, Cenc-resp m.a^' reru-
late the exercise of such grants within certain limits, exten'-''ing
at least to the prohibition of contracts relating to intersta'!'** com-
merce which vvould extinguisii all competition between otherwise com-
peting railroad corporations, anl whicli wcu Id in that wa;'" restra-’n
interstate trade cr commerce. Ordinary freedom of contract in the
use and management of their property does not require the right to
combine as cne consolidated, powerful association, eliminating com.-
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^ petition and maintaining higher rates. "The prohihlticn snch
contracts may in the judgment of Congress "be one of t’’o reascnahle
necessities for the proper regulation c f commerce, and Congress is '^’^e
judge of such necessity and propriety, unless, in ease a possible
gross perversion of tliis principle, the courts might he applied to
for relief." The power is properly exercised until the llmitatiors
and guarantees cf the constitution are violated. A citizen has net
the right to pursue any livelihood or vocation
,
ou+-, only lawCnl ones,
and Congress has the power to restrain him from mah:ing c ntracts on
certain subjects and in certain ci rcuras tandes . i?’usbie v. IT. C. 157
U. 3. 160. The power accordingly exists in vCongress to pass this
statute and its validity cannot be questioned.
The const ituti'- nal Ity of the Cherman Act was next discussed in






Here it was urged that the power cf Congress to regulate interstate
commerce is limited to its protection from acts of interference >y
state legislation ^r by regulations made under its authcrlly by sere
pulitical subdivision of the state, including 'also congressional
power over common carriers, elevator, gas and water companies, '"or
reasons peculiar to such companies, but tha' it does net Include the
general power to interfere ’with or prohibit private contracts between
citizens, even t ough such contracts have interstate commerce '’or their
object, and result in a direct and substantial c’bs tructic n to or regular
tion of that commerce.
This argument is founded cn the assertion that the reason ^or-
vesting in Congress the pow r to regulate commerce was tc Insure uni-
formity of regula t ic n , and to prevent the pcss ihi li ’y o " let i ’ r
and d is crininat ing st^te legislaticn, tegethor with the '’urth'^r
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claim that the const itut iora fnarantces litorty cf private contract to
the citizen, at least upon commercial snh,‘eots, ani. to that e^rtent the
guarantee operates as a limitation on the pcw^r o-^ Congres'^ to reru-
late commerce
.
t?he court heli, that the reasons V7hic>: may have causel
the framers of the ccnstitutior to rencse the pc-^'er to regnlat^ inter-
state commerce in Congress, do not a'^'^ect or limit "^he c'tev*' o;? the
pcv/er itself. Under the cons t i i c’^al grant cf nc'^^r ’’O Conyress,
"that "body may enact such legislation as shall declare voi'^ and
prohibit the performance of any contract between individuals or cor-
prrations v/here the natural and direct effect cf such a contract will
be, when carried cut, to directly, and not as a nem i>'cid«nt to o‘*‘’-'cr
and innocent purposes, regulate to any substantial extent i'.terstate
commerce (including foreign commerce)." The court also refused to
assent to the correctness cf the proposition that the' cons t itu"^ i oral
guaranty cf liberty to the individual to enter into private contracts
limits the power of Congress and prevents it from legislating upon
the subject of contracts of the class mentioned.
The pcwcr to regulate interstate commerce is full and complete in
Congress. There is no limitation excludin?- private contracts, ahS
it does not come under the clause relating to life, liberty an'’ pro-




573, includes the right to enter ir;tc certa"'^ classes ’’-'usiness, but
it has never been held, and properly so, that the ^crd irclu'’es "t’-^e
right cf an individual to enter into private contracts upcn all su’’^-
jects, no matter what their nature, and wholly irrespective, (among
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regulation of interstate ccmmerce, anl in the vicleticn of an act
Congress ux^on that subject. The provision in the Constitution iocs
net exclude Congress frcci legislating with regard "^o ccrtr8r>ts cf
the above nature while in the exercise oi' its constitutional rig’^t to
regulate commerce among the states. Cn the cortrarv, we
provision regarding the liberty of "^he eit^’sen ' s
,
to some extent,
limited by the commerce clause c the Cons t i tut i O’"
,
an i t^^et ‘'t'e power
cf Congress to regui^te interstate ccmmerce ^emprises t^e r'''gh-^ to
enact a law prchihitlng the citizen from enterinr into thc=’e pr-ivat*®
contracts which directly and substantially, and not merel” Irdirectl’",
remotely, incidentally and collaterally, reguiate to a greater or less
degree ccmmerce among ‘he States. The scope cf the language of t’-^e
constitution must net be enlarged to such an extent.’’
If private contracts c^n restrain -Interstate ccmmerce, why
should net Congress reach them in t^at power, just as ^^"ell as it cen-
cededly migit reach them if their conditions w^^re embodied in some state
statute? Both are under the control cf Congress . Liberty con-
tract in such a case would be giving sovereign powers to the subject,
which properly belong to Congress. ”Hegula+icr, to any substantial
extent, cf such a subject by any other power than that o'*" Congress,
after Congress has itsel-^ acted thereon, even t’-"C such regulation is
effected by means cf' private contracts between ind-’viiual^ cr cerpera-
tiona, is Illegal, and we are unaware c " any reason why it is nc^ as
objectionable when attempted by ind"^ ' '^uals as by the state itsel-^.”
Congress has jurisdiction in c^^e c-ase as much as n "he other.
The states have exclusive jurisdiction over various matters,




”"ut upon the matter cf irterptate arc! '^orei£;T commoree ar."’ tv-*? rrop^r
regulation therof, the subject being net alone national but inter-
national in its character, the great importance cf having but one
spuree for the law which regulates that commerce throughout the
length anl breadt’ri cf the lanl cannet nn our opinion be overestimated,
liach state in that event would I'lave complete jurisdiction over the
commerce which was wholly within its' borders, while the jurisdiction
cf Congress, under the provisions of the Constitution, over Interstate
commerce would be paramount, and would Include therein jurisdiction
over contracts of the nature we have been discussing,"
The defendants in this case relied to some extent on dicta in
Hailrcad Co. v. Richmond, 19 "all. 5S4, to the ^ffebt that it never
was intended that the power of Congress should he exercise'^ so as to
interfere with private contracts not designed, at the t ime they
made, to create impediments to interstate commerce. To this the court
replied: ''There is no intimation in th^s remarV that Conp'ress has ho
power to legislate regardig those contracts which do directly regulate
and restrain interstate commerce. The inference is cuite the reverse,
and it is plain that the ease assumes if private centraets when ent^'-rod
into do directly interfere with and regulate interstate ccm’'''erce
,
Congress had power to condemn them" "The fact o’-'^ a direct an^'’ sub-
stantial reguadticn is the important part of the ccntract, an-'’ that
regulation existing, it is unimportant that it was net so des ignc'-’’ . -
-
V/here the ccntract affects interstate commerce only incidentaljhy and
not directly, the fact that it was not designed or intended to sf'^ect
such commerce is simply hn additional reason for hcldinr the ccntract
valid, and net touched by the act cf Congress."
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The question V7us aruin raised ir the case of the Northern Se-
curities Cc
.
V. U. S. 195 U. S. 197; this time from the standpoint
that as the Gomnan:; ;7as a state corpcraticn and as it s accuisition
.
, of the stock of the Great northern and northern Pacific Hailwax" Ccmpan-
ies v/as not inconsistent with the powers conferred hy its chart'^r, the
enforcement of the act of Ccnp-ress as arai’-st those ^orpcraticns would
be an unautbori;^ed interference by the national government with t^^e
internal commerce of the States creatinf’ those corporat i c ns .
The defendants laid considerable stress on the claim that what-
ever may be the pov;or of a State over such sub fleets, Conpress cannot
forbid sinple individuals from diapesinp their stoc> in a s^'ate
corporation, even if such corporation be enpaped in interstate and
international corrimerce, since “he hcldinp.or piirchase by a s'^ate cor-
poration, or the purchase by individuals, of the stock of another cor-
poration, for whatever purpose, is a matter in resx>ect C'f’ whic’' Con-
gress has no authority under the Constitution. It was held unnecess-
ary in this case to consider such abstract, peneral ouestirns. ’’The
government does not contend that the acquisition and ownership of stock
in a state railroad corporation is itself interstate commerce, if that
corporation be enpaped in interstate commerce. 7hat it does contend
is that the existence of a combination amerp the s toc^'hclders corn-
pet inp railroad cofnv)&J^i®‘* which in violtiticn O'^ the act Oonpress
restrains interstate and international commerce t’-rouph tl'e arerc'^
of a common corporate trustee designated to act for betV’ ccmpan^' es
in repressing free competition between them, is illegal. Indeuen-
dently of any question of the mere ownershiu of stoc^' or tw,* orpan'-
zaticn of a state corporation
,
can if in reason said that
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such a comhinst icri is not •^rntracc'’ by the very t<“rm? cf^ ^he Arti-
Trust Act?"
The court quoted Liarshall C. J. in Gibbons v. Grdcn, 9 'Th . 1,
who laid dov;n tiie rule that the pov/er of Ccnyress to reyulate ccrr'r’erce
amcn^ the States and V7lt?i fcreifn rations is the po^^er "to pr^scrlt*'
the rule by which commerce is to be rcverned", tViat such povver "is
complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extend, and ac>-
n07/ledg-es no limitations other than are prescribed ir the Ccrs^itu-
tion;" that "if as has always been understood, the scverei^-nty o-^ Con-
gress though limited to specific objects, is plenar-7 as to t’cse ob-
jects, tl.e power over commerce with foreign nations and amonr the
several States, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it woul' be
in a single government having in its ccnstiiution the same restric-
tions on the exercise c? t e pc7/er as are found in the Constitution
the United States."
"The rule for international and interstate oommerce^ adopte-^ in
this case was that it should not be vexed by ccrrbina^icns
,
conspira-
cies er monopolies which restrain com.merce by destroying or res t riot -i rc^
ccmpet it ion , The question is, 7/helher Congress has power to a'-'’opt
this rule, ana not as to the eccncraic 7/isdom tbereo'^. As in ^be
judgment of Ccnrress the public ccn^^enience and tbe genrral welfare
will be best subserved when tbe natural la'^s comnetiticn ar®
und is turbei|pby those engaged in interstate commerce, and as Congress
has embodied that rule in a statute, that must be, ^cr all,










*\-^“ ^ -5,'v r jjf'-’' '/. >> ;- 7 i‘
’








































rsrg>? ;tr i^fTnarT^* si
,
f.avlsjJS.
*»nt’ ffbl iiir ‘HitivajI yf\*rail*tavo^ r>I .^a is ni
I . - •
*'
-- T • -5 * '' >
i tarj.o? «^f<,),- rt? #;xbv bb- a’ ^ '1 b^r>f^"‘Xi4*j:^x© t»v/j!'-
"r*"
i









^ •; H *














I*.;' .•...- •;., . T. . .- -• • .'/






.jJi, ' . - ; • • . I-'- • , •^ 4, i
,-'•' •
'




boi • ^‘^^Jha4 ^ 0 s*rfl ra*r:'r/3^ *?ff? -»1 rJPx.Wj
sB-^TfiaoD, *m ^,^.R .j^naAc^ao 0,t T\<*(X*iuJ-<ftbn;:^j|












'-\. ' . ' ,/'
'
p ,. "an -T>n9 .I'var- ^0 o^ 4^1- •£trfI'--'T-^ - . fV4>i?,
tf'.'. .HKKL^ . ^ V -
"rM
The defense attempted tc ar^uc that the act vzas’ unccrs t i tnt i cnal
under the Tenth Amendment: "the po'.vers net delog-atei to the I'nited
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively or to the People,” urfinp- that
any decree preventing- the ITorthern Securities Cernuany from e-xercisirp
the pov;er it had acquired, v/culd be an invasion of t>-e rlp-ht of ^-’re
States when exertinf their power tc create corporations. This the
court declared was inconsistent with all pr^viou? decisions rerar'^ ’
the powers of the national royerr.r.ert cv*r matters committed tc ’’t.
”Po State can, by merely creatin?- a corporation, or n an-^^ other mc-^’e
project its authority into other States, and across the cent i bent, sc
as tc prevent Cens-ress from exercising the power -it pcs''ess<»s nnder
the Constitution over interstate and international ccmmerc'*, or so as
to exempt its corporations en£-aped in interstate cc'^m'^rc* -^rom che-^ li-
enee tc an^; rule lav/ful'iy established bjr Cen^-ress -^’cr such com.'^^rce
,
”
"livery corporation created by a Sta-i e is necessarily .subject- tc th«
supreme law of the. land. The Federal court raa;- not have th** power
to forfeit the charter or prohibit it -^rom accuirlny real es‘*‘a't-», ’’n-
creasins- its atoeb, etc., but it ma^^ prevent that ccm.pany in its
capacity as a hcldin£- corporation and trustee, from carryinr- cut the
purposes of a combination formed in restraint trade. Jt 7/cul'^ be
extraordinary if the court in executing- the act C"^ Co gross ccul-^ net
lay hands upon that company and prevent It from doing that v/hich i"^
done, will defeat the act of Cengrees." "In s'-ert, ‘'he court may
malre any order necessary tc bring about the d-'escluticn rr suppress ic
of an illegal combination that restra'ins intorsta-^e commerce." All
this can be deno without infrir.ging- on the Ttates and no device or
- 3 '. :-:i '-V -^5^ :.^ ..J\y.i
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evasion avail to avcii the e::ercise ^>’e ^ederal nc'Ter.
The contention of the defendants t’-at Conpres? did net intAr'^’ ”to
limit the pov;er of the several States to create corperat 1 ors , de^^'ne
their purposes, fix the amount of their capital and determirn^ v7ho may
buy, 0 /vn and sell the stock”, v;as disposed of as hel’^c- true hr't- not
meeting the controlling questions in the case. ”3o -^ar as th,-- Con-
stitution of the United States is concerned , a State ma^^ indeed, create
a corporation, define its pov7ers
,
prescribe t^e amount of its stcc>
and the mode in which it may be transferred. It ma^ even authorize
one of its corporotiens to engage in commerce every "''ind, domest‘’c,
interstate, and international, but neither a state corperatien ncr ’‘ts
sttckhcldera can, by reason of the ncn-acticn of '^he Sts'*^'^- or hy means
of any combination among such stockholders, inter 'er'* with the com-
plete enforcement of any rule lawfully devised by Cenrress for the con-
duct of commerce among the States or with foreign nations; ^or
interstate and intern?: ti cnal commerce is hy th'^ Const ituticn under the
control of Congress, and it belongs to t^^'e legislative der^artm^nt ot*
the Covernment to prescribe rules ^cr *Ve cr’^'^'uc'^ c tVat con'"'^rce.
V/hilst every ins t rumental i ty <^(;'roes 1 r commerce 1° s’l^'lect state
control, every instrumental’’
' y of interstate ccmmerc'^ may be reac^^d
and controlled by national' authority, so far ?:S to ccm.p<»l df to r<"sppct
the rules for such commerce lawfully estahlisbed by Congress,
V/e repeat that nc State can endow any of its cerporat ions
,
or an:’ cor,-
binaticn of its citizens with autberity to restrain interstate or
international commerce or to disobey tbe national 'will as ma’^ t ’’es'’-
legal enactments of Congress. So long as Congress ''='eeps wit^'-'n tv-e
limits of its authority as defi-ned by the Constitution, its regu]atirv$
’»#rri
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of interstate and international conrierce, v/hether founded in ’.viadon
or net, ciist be submitted to by all."
From an exarainaticn of the briefs of the various parties to lit-
igation under the Sherman **ct, have attemnted to urre the uncen-
s titutionality of the statute, it appears th'-t all serious efforts to
declare it void have rested upon the Fifth Amendment. They are all
built on the idea that interference by Senrress in the industrial
field is a violation of the rights c" the citizen. But liberty
trade dees net imtjly liberty on the part a corporation or individ-
uals to defy the national 7/ill, w’-cn legal! v expres-edT For dc^s
enforcement of a legal enactment of Icngress infringe, in any prefer
sense, the general, inherent right of everyone to accutre an'"' hoi'
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Inters tfc.te Goramerce. • Con£;ress ’nas power over cocmerce ^cnonr the states
vvhioh”cuiJsid td of intercourse and traffic, between their cit-^zens
and includes tlie transucrtaticn cf persons and prcpertp, a:- v'eli as
tiie purchase, sale and exchang-e ccmrnodi ti'^s This inclu'^es fl)
the actual transpcrtat ion cf commodities and perse ns between states.
(2) The instrumentalities and processes O"^ such transpcrtat icn . f/')
a11 ne£-ot iat ions and contracts which have for ch,1efc^, or involve
as an element thereof, such trsnsmisslcn or passar'^ ^rom C'^^- stat® to
another. It beg-ins when transportation begins, and terminates v’ '•n
the mass of the property is in the ether state. i)e]i"erv tc a e-rr-’^^r
indicates, as a general rule, the time cf beginnin,!:- c^ the interstate
character of the comr;erce. I.dere prepar aticn for transpertaP 1 0 ’" is
not sufficient. In re Greene, 52 Fed. 1C 4
.
Theoretically the ccntrol cf Congress ever com''''crce among t><*
states is si''ple, and the essential '^seters in f'e ‘’eterm.inat ion o^
its jurisdiction are all included in the preceding pararrap'^ . As a
practical matter, hcv;evor,it often becomes extremely i f "i cn.lt -^ix
the reason that the same article in the course o'* its progress from
producer to consumer may be at one moment an element in' the ccrv'-erce c
a state only, and the next an element cf interstate cr -^creign ccm.'^erce.
In the case of actual transport at 1 c n c" ccmmcil'^ies a^'’ nArso''s 'e-
tween states little difficulty is experienced, since i is a pure
matter of fact, involving no legal doctrin-us. ’Then the rnesti’cn con-
cerns instrumentalities and processes '^.ranspe rtat io 'i i Is a
matter cf ccnsid-'rahle n’’'cety tc decide what instrumentalities an"’’
processes are directly cene rned with interstate traf"f^ic and wV'at are
V"i.an'. ^23%<^IJ"qC • .‘^'-•o*i3mi,oQ,.ft'. ..: ';*l y*ql
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merely inci'lental to tra'le 'vithin the ‘ho'iy a state. ?urt v-ermor^ ,
the same dif '"i.culty arises in the case c ne^-c t iat ic ns sni oci^tracts
affectinr interstate ccmrnsrce, since the same '’crm c s ta+ err!'’'!!': ms*'
one time have an interstate s l£*nif iconce ani at ancth<«r have an intra-
state character only. lominr tc speci'^ic instances, “’-e i s 1 1 ’-ct i c ns
tc he chserved are renerally he'"T;een the manv ^acture an article in
preparation for interstate hnsiness, an 1 its actual i'-icc' i'. r into the
current of interstate commerce; tetwoen negotiations ani contracts
for the sale or purchase o'’ articles in ether states, anl mere facili-
ties offeree tc expedite such transactions; between the ccntrcl
factors in interstate commerce, and actual participation in that com-
merce itself.
The Distinction between Treparat ion for and Tart ic 1 pat io-' in I nter-
state Commerce
. The point on whjicli the lecisicn turned, in th.e f . C.
height case, 15G h. S. 1, was the fact that the sugar ccm.T'inat i on at
that time was engaged in the manulacture o " sup'cvr rather ^han in its
sale among the several Itates
. Thei^ Fu 11 er G.J. said in tM? regar ' :
’’Contracts to buy, sell, or eKchan^e goo Is to be transported amo 'g the
several States, the transportation and its instrumertalit
,
an' arti-
cles bought, sold, or exchanged for trie purpose c*' such transi-' among
the States, or put in the way of "Tarsi ma:* revuls^ t’^'is is
because they form part of interstate ccmm''rce or trade. The fact
that an article is manu'^actu red '^cr expert tc another Sta^e dees net
itself mahre it an article cf inter tate commerce, and the i’':tent c"
manufacturer does not di'er.min^ the time when the article cr product
passes frern the control cf the State and belongs to commerce.”
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fCourt, however, whether the fact that sale *he prclnc^ -ir cf-er
States was ccntenplated
,
dil r.ct r Inr the ccmhinat Ion at har within
the terms of the act. Harlan J . in his dissenting cpinicn arrne'^
from '^ibhcns v. Cfden that ’’these concerns 'which affect the ''fate?
generally" are proper sutiects of regulation unier the Act and that
this case presented an instance of Interstate ccmr.erco in this prep'^r
sense. According to his int erpretat i on cf the Act, interstate cem-
merce, ernlracing transportation, includes the purchase and sale
articles that are intended tc be transported frem one state to another
every species cf commercial intercourse among the States and with
foreign nations is within the purview cf the Act.
The Addyston Pipe and Steel Case, 175 U. S. 211, was an instance
of a contract in restraint cf trade made by a cembinatien within the
body of a state, but operating tc ccntrcl ccmmerce among the states.
In that case it was said: "any combination amenr dealers a commodi-
ty which has not yet passed from; the state, which in its d-'rect ar'S
immediate e'^^fect, fcreclcses all cornpe 1 1 1. 1 o'-; aril enhances the Durc’’'’8se
price for which such commodity wcul"^ ct’-'er-.- L- e -be delivered at -'ts
destination in another State, 'would be in our cpinicn one cf res'*^ra'’'t
of trade or commerce among the States, even if the a -tide tc he '"rans
ported and delivered in another "tate v/ere still taxable at its place
of manufacture." The control cf Congress dees not e^'-tend tc ^he
manufaeturi-j of goods vjhieli tiie prc-ducer may intend tc sell in another
state, as the sale is the direct result of the m.anu-"ac tnre ; the con-
tract anticipating this sale however, dc'S ameupt tc a regulation.
The Court was careful to state that Congress had not acouired any
- i
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jurisdiction over that part of the ccmh/ination and agreement, which
related to commerce within the State, hy reason of the -^act
that it also covered commerce which was interstate. Aceorrlin^ly
,
the
right to ccrahine in regard to a certain proposal frr pipe deliveraht
e
in their own state could not he reached, and no judgmont con Id he
given by tne court .. x: that pcrticular count.
Contrac ts affecting Interst ate Ccromerce, an d 'facilities afforded it
In U. 3. V. Swift et al, 122 fed. 528, and 196 V. S. ?75, the defend-
ants vxere packers v/hc attempted tc escape the operation of the Act by
urging that they were not engaged ^n interstate commerce. Cattle were
shipped from dlfferex'.t states tc t^e °tcc‘’' in .Cv^-’carc, were “^here
bought by the companies, converted ''rtc meat products, an i -'hipne'’
again to the c< nsumers
.
The court refused to allow, ‘he cor'*’ enti O’^
the defendants, ccnsidereing the underlying test tc be that the trans-
acvicn, as an entirety
,
including each part calculated tc bri"?- a'hcut the
result cent emplatod
,
reached into two or mr're states, and that the
parties dealing with reference thereto dealt from different states.
An interstate ccminercial transaeticr, in t'-^.e cn.i<-icr) cf the ccur+
,
is a-ri
affair rising In one state, centering in the act cf exchanm*^-. an”^
ultimately reaching a consumer in another state. fach essent'al part
cf the affair, is tc 'he considered as much interstate ccm 'erce as is
the center. The body cf these t ransact ions is regarded as two-fold:
it reaches baclrward to the purchase cf that v;hleh comes from one
state and forward to .the sale in another state. The purchase cf
cattle shipped habitiially from, ether states ' n the expectation that the
companies will bu;/, is interstate commerce. C c mmien -i ng in the ''uprem.e
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Court on the interstate charact -r c this traffic , Ilclmes c
.
'’./hen cattle are sent f c r sale from a place in one state, -rnt^ the
expectation that they '.vii: end their transit, a^’t-r mjrc’^as^, in
another, and 'jhen in effect they do so, ;vith cnl:" f'c i n^errn nt icn
necessary to find a purchaser at the stoc'^ yards , a’-^ 77’’en is
a typical constantly recurring course, the current thus e*^istinr
is a current of commerce amcnr the States.”
The obverse case was Unite! States v. Ecphins et al , 9f Ued
.
529 and 171 U. 3. 577. The defendants were commission merchants at
Uansss City enfared in the prrehaae an! sale cf cat + le '^«ans an
Exchange. In the lower courts the business was hel l tc ‘''e n t • rs tat^ ,
largely on account of the fact that the trade 'was solid te-’ -n Traricus
states and loans were made upon the cattil before s^^ipment. In t’ e
Supreme Court, however, the judgment was reversed on t^-^ rronn! that
+-Vi(» as'sor’Tn+'ir'vi -iri y n p 77 p '' ''o v'
n
i'^tersa'^* ccpm'^rce
but did not actually engaf e therein. The court intima'^ed t’-at at]
agreements which result in iricreastd cost cf interstate commerce do net
fall vdthin the- Act; the result must be direct and immediate. Thus
there may be a distinction between the scl
c
1 tat icn a '^rum’^'er
secures the shipment cf cattle, as in ^.he '^w: '^t cas'
,
an" t'-e solidta-
ticn of an agent who urges s^^iunrrs ic ma''’'e use a ^acidity cf'’'"'r''d
to interstate commerce by such a cembinatien as t’lr-t involved in the
Hopkins case.
Participation in interstate cemm rvee nd ownership of sto-c''~ in com-
panies engaged therein. The distinction was drawn b*' T’hite d, in his
dissenting opinion in the ITcrth.ern Securities case, between participation
in interstate commerce And more ownership cT stock in companies en-
f «^!,- --V':
f.
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£’ia£ed in auch traffic. Ee says, flic pierary authority c -on£re.?p
over interstate commerce, its rifht to rorulate it iro the -^ullest ex-
tent, to fix the rates tc he charg-ei for the mcvemont of interstate
commerce, to legislate concerning the ways anl vel'cles actually en-
gaged in such traffic, and tc exert any and every other power over
such commerce, wiiich flo'ws from t’le authcri'^.y conferred hy the Cons'll tu
tion, is conceded. But these concessicns do no^. concern ‘‘hf» cues^ion
involved in this case, wliich Is net as tc the scope o'^ the power o-^
Congress tc regulate commerce, hut wh.other t'no power e/itmls to the
regulation of ownership of stock in railroads, wi.ieh is not comnerce
at all. The power of Congress dees net embrace the power to regulate’
the ownersiiip of stock in state corporations, though such coruo rat ions
be in part engaged in interstate commerce, under t’'.e delin'’ tion O"^
commerce in dibbona v. Cgden . ’’Commerce undcubte'ly is trafTic,
but it is something mere, it is intercourse, t’lat is, traffic
between the States, and intercourse betw en the States. " The
ov/nersiiip of stock in a state corporation cannot be sai l to be in ary
sense traffic between t’ue otates'or intercourse betv'/een them. Comment
ing furtuer i^n tiie definition in Gibbons v. Ogd ,n an'’ particularly
on that part of it v/hicli declares that interstate commerce ’’describes
the eomrriercial intercourse be’ween nations and parts o nations” Justic
'i'^'liite asks: Gan the o’wnership of st-ock n a tate corporation, by the
most lat itud ina rian construction, be embraced by the words ”comm''rc’’ si
intercourse between nations and parts c " nations”?
Justice 7hite also considers that any construction allowinr t>’e
view t’nat Congress has the rig lit to regulate the ownership c*” stoc’^ in
companies cliartered Igy state authority, is absolutely des *: ruct i ve of
l.ea^trrfticib vOnr ^
1^, » 'tOi rtojv >r 'jff’l 'C<f)»ii» , ^a*ri>qiP06
*;;'









.^i-' ^rrA>, \ ' ^iv/jcf-’i D hi aolUi-ailil;




















c/ '-r» ,'i >^‘^*^^0';'£"*]l^ *> aciT^ f>r‘- ilijCl :cjx6xj' ?>i
















: \ _..^c -I' “fjy
y'.rl -siAoe--? ernfe*^ aa^t ’ruf*i 4 3^*^'
; V fe' . "^^/i•'>i•i^Li .* ,f. .;><?* . . • _ • , 1^
tt> * k.
• • *. ft
. .L .




the Tenth Amendment v/hich provider that "The pov/ei'S nc-- delegate'' to
the United States "by the Gcrstitiition nor prchihited to it h-y f'^e
States, are reserved tc the States respective!’’ or to ^^e People.”
This, he considers, follovvs from the fact that the aiithorlty Congress
to regulate on the suhject can rest only cn the proposition that its
power ever commerce emhraC',s the right to control the owners’' ip c_^
railroads doir.g in part an interstate 'buainess. Th« pow«r tc control
the ownership of such railroads, 7/ould necessaril’’ eb'brace th;cir
organisation. Hence it would 'be in the power of Congress tc a'brcga + e
every such railroad charter granted by the states, if C-ngress deeme'^
tiiat the rights offered "by such st-.te charters tended tc restrain
interstate ccmmorco. Purthermore
,
this pev/er won Id extend to the
control vjf consolidating state railroads dcinr in part an interstate
business, though expressly authorized by the states, and wo^ild- over-
throw every state law fcrbidciino snch ccnsolidaticns
,
^cr Cc’-rress
could permit, if it could -^orbld them.
The principle that the ownership o'^ propert’^ is '•n'brac''d wi'^hin
the power of Congress tc rep u late cornmer<^e. w>’erie”er t’^at '^e'^-ms
that a particular character of ownership, i"^‘ allowed to eent-inne, may
restrain commerce between the states or create a rnoncpcl” th^^r-'O''^, is
*in Justice White's opinion in conflict with the most elenontary con-
c.epticns of rights of property. Her lie believes it would follow,
if Congress deemed that the accjuisiticn by one or more i i vi duals
engaged In interstate commerce, more t’^an a certain amount of pro-
X>erty, would be preiudicial tc^ 'nterstate commerce, that the amoun"^
property held or tlie amount which mirht be em.plcye'''. in intfersta'*' e eom-
tnerce, could be regulated.
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The aecisicE ia the case rested cn the fact the ccr secner.ces
abcve pcintcd cut we''e net involved
,
since the cnl:^ issue 7/as t'~;e rip'^t
of the ITcrthern Securi t ies • Cc . to acquire an 1 own stre"'*. T’-^e




is ere th'^^r; th^- rower
of individuals or cerporatic s, when net nerel"’ crparr' ,nr ''’ +c hcl'^
stcclT, an entirely' different thinr. To f^^is propos ^ t icn
,
Justice
white refused to assent. "e censi d‘-:r<^'d that power emhra' ^s
ownership, then the authority of ^enfress ever all o’vnersh'p ^^’V^io>' i
its iudg-ment may affect interstate commerce, nc-cosrarily ‘e:Kists. That
v;ould also mean that a man mig-ht not do th'rouc’h a corperatien that wh ic?t
irV could do alone as an individual. Such a result would >'e anomalous,
as the xtower to regulate includes int-rstat^^ commerc'' cf every d'scrlp-
ticn ih libe degree.
Applicstion of the Act to Common Carriers . It was first sericusl;^
urged in the Trans -Missouri Freight Association Case that thp Act does
not apply to commer. carriers. It v/as there said: "Thr languare cf the
Act includ' s every . contract
,
comhinaticr in the form c"^ trust or other-
wise, or conspiracy, in restraint cf trade or commerce among the sov-
'eral Stat'es or with foreign nations." A contract tt- t is iu restraint
of trade or commerce is hy the strict language c*' ti-'p Act prohi^^ited,
even though h' tween ccm.peting carr1''rs railroad, and o’^en
it affects traffic rates only. such an agreement restrains tra-’^-
or ccmmerc;, it is prchlhited; u’^less it can he said t>'J5t S’"' arre^men'^,
whatever its terms, relating to transportation, cannot r‘'*strair +rade
or commerce. There is no escap- from the conclusion that i an'*
agreement of such a nature does restrain it, it is condemned hy the
Act, Transportation is interstate ccnmercf^, a^d agreepe’'«ts > f'tveen
persons engeg'd in such business relate to cemm.-rce
«iVTn5 f " f.'TO-'’':^'? B' • , hf»v C '>^3l* -jrt ,^»w.^ittr doJar oq ov 3ae
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(arid may restrain it. The terms of the Act do net hear ont t^e cen-
structiOB urged hy the defendants, namely, that it 77as intended to
reach trusts only. The fact that Section 6, relating to fer'^etture
does not apoly to railroads is no ground for arguing that t'^e rest
of thh Act is not applicahle.
It was urged that an agreement liVe the one in Question was
authcri^ied hy the Commerce Act, and that an inte>'pretaticn of the Anti-
Trust Act to include carriers carries with it a repeal tv.. Commerce
Act. Further, if Congress had intended tc afec"^ raiircais, it
would ha\"e amended the Commerce Act in terms. But the Commerce Act
does not authorize agreements cf th^'s sort. It may not proh-'hi*,
but it is far from authorizing them. The Sherman Act is a general
statute, covering all interstate commerce, and attains results not
to be gained by simple amendment cf the Commerce Act. T^e twe are net
inconsistent.
The defendants attempted tc put in evidence the debates in Con-
gress v;hich were held previous to the passing of the Sherman Act, in
order tc show that it was not ccntemplatel that railroads should he
subject to its previsions. The Court, however, held that deha'^es
in Congress were net appropriate sources cf infermati cn to d’’' soever
the meaning cf the language of the statute, and insisted t’-^at the C’"!’’
proper source is the language of the Act and ^ he I'lstcr'^'’ t’^e times.
In the opinion cf the Court these dc net shor; that the Act was dir-
ected against trusts alcno and they further shew nc intenticn cn t^e
par' . ^ eCongress tc consider railreads as economically and
politically in a different situation fr. m ct^-:<=»r com.h i na^ i cna . ""he











- Cl ^ ‘ V’^'* ^ ' * ' * r f
„
w . . fkXcfjjoitXi^oua J'oa* f;j io« Vi^ xo
^,











r^^'rporrf ::^t*f>tfo hiT tnifii *£i^itj e^Wk 3'I
. t‘





































































.'f-* vavA^ ,d*ii/aC jjxf?
^













T?.r«>oai*^^fc’ b'd /^‘‘ifnb'f :>rr,i *- o ' snbxrTeji
aW la .uvi(UJaAK,^<ii
n'Km^
•Ij'* ‘ :f^d* 3 iCff;? «’c
















-t!-** ,*oA wori.s of;
.
o-i^'.rro' *r ^ 5n ?>:'^ frr-a C’Ct'afi^ ct^ri^ ^dsniijr^‘ JBow4>»







'< ^rie «;'»axC^'OT •r‘'^t4‘‘n30 ' ad* cac'tr^aaO. /^oVn^tx;












’-.'“V-J±J^^: - ^:-^iiJlir Wm^
-
u^and contracts in restraint cT trade, which are vo i 1 repardlesf-
their form; for the Act includes all Interstate ccmnorce, whether
transpcrtaticn
,
purchase or sale. It may at times he difficult to
draw the precise line hetvveen these thirds 7/hich are cempre’' en'^'^ed hy
the term, and those which are. net, hut transportation is plainly in-
cluded
.
V/hite J. dissented from this reaseninf as follows: ”TTie Interstate
Commerce Act is a special act, and th;e Sherman Act is a g'BBral lav;.
The rule that a general will net repeal a special statute 1"* pcss-ihle,
should ap. ly. Here t'ne general act ta>es av/ay the pov/ers grante''"’ hy
the special act. It was not intended tc hit the railroads w’hen t
v/as debated in Congress. The contract here male is directly sanction-
ed or impliedly authorized hy the Interstate Commerce Act. '.Vhen
that act expressly ferhiis contracts and comhinatiens between rail-
roads for pooling, and makes no mention of ether contracts, it is
clear that the continued existence of such contracts v;as ecntemplat ed . ”
Of late years, however, the ouestion has not been raised and it
is nev/ considered v/ell settled that there can he no dou'''t of t'-^e in-
tention of Congress tc include comhinat i ens enva-c-ei in •^rans pc. rtat
,
as well as industrial eomhinstiers . Contracts in res'^ra-’ tra-^e
and monopolies are prohibited hy the Act; and the particular source
from which they emanate does net affect their legal status.
* >•
tm
lat^rpretation of the Act. In the Stanlarl Oil Gass 221 U. 3. 1,
Ohief* custice .7nite intiraates that all the cases under the Sherman
Act are reconcilable with the possible exception of the Trans s sour
i
Freight association Case and the Joint Traffic Association Case v/hie^,
though correctly decided, are mis leadi nr in the .stater<^’^‘^ t’^'e law.
It seems, however, that In spite of this, dictum, three di'stinct p^-r^'ods
0 j. Judicial interpretation of the Act are 1 i s t ins"uishable
. For a
_ev/ yccirc afuer the passage of the jn.ct
,
ir ’was gonerallv considered
by the District and circuit Qourts t lat the statute merely incorporated
the common lav/ into United Jtates law, though going beyond it in one
or two respocuS. The oupreme Court in the Trans
-I.I1 ss curi Freight
Association Case discountenanced this doctrine, however, an'i laid down
the rule that all possible restraints o interstate ecmmerce were unlav?
tul. This decision was followed for several 7/ears
,
bu*^. was finally
over-ruled as a matter of ^act
,
regardless o^ ^’ntimationp to t>^e
contrary in the Standarn Cil and Tobacco Cases, where the ecirt rev'''rt —
ed to a rule approximately the same as that followed earlier
decisions of the inferior courts. The course of interpretation by
the courts can be traced as follows;
1. The first period: th^ pericd of doubt, 189C-1897 'from t>^e
passing cf the Act to the decision in Tnited States v. Trans
-Liisscwri
Breigdit Associabicn, 166 U, S, 29C). In this ‘Dericd the nrcbdem of
interpretation cf the Act was rpimsrlly for the District and Circuit
Courts, which had no decision of the Supreme Cour*^ tc p-uide '^.heir
tulings
, The general opinion among the iueges of the lower courts
was tnat the statute was much li>e common law, and that no denarture
J"'Vij *i#-t '^nTl}*X,;n^OO^
8r '• *>J’ ^ ' :? - . -^. . -'-TV!
g .. u- V '* i '-!l8^
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i^from i^re -exis t inr law was ccrjt'smnlatel except in so far as wor-
ing- of the Act made it necessary in a few particular instances.
Jackson, Gir. J. in re Greene, 52- Fed. 104, calls attention to the
fact that in the consideration of the indictment at bar it shcnl^ be
borne in mind that there are no common-law offenses afainst the United
States; that tho federal courts cannot resort to the common law a? a
source of criminal j”risd ict ion ; that crimes an i of ^.enses , cog^ninable
under the authority the United '^tates are snc’-', on'’y such^ es
are expressly; desig-nated by law; an'^ that Conc-r^ss must de-^’’^^' ^’^ese
crimes, fix their punishment, and eor-^--'r jur is d i c'*' i on to '*'ry
them. 7 Granch. 32; 1 7h . 15; 1C 3 U. S. 199. He re-elects th^
general attitude of the courts at this period when he hold’s t'-at
follows from these considerat ic’^s that i •*’ Ccngr^^ss, un-^'^r t’-^e exercise
of powers conferred by the constitution, adopts or creates common-law
offenses, the courts may properly Icob to that hc^p ;uri§pru'^ence
for the true meaning and definition of such crimes, i they are not
clearly defined in the act creating "^hem. 2 Gurt . 446. 4 Fed. 193.
The Act of July 2, 139C, in declaring that contracts, combina'^icns and
conspiracies in restraint cf trade an' commerce between the states
and foreign countries are not only illegal, but constitute criminal
offensGS, while in the main identical with the common law, gees a step
beyond it in tho punishment cf contracts in restraint of trade. v;-'' icb
,
thougrh ... T ^ 1Un »« X u X
,




It adopts the common law in making' combinations an"! ccnsp/racies in
restraint cf the designated trade and ccmm''rce crin'nal c^’^enses, a^^d
creates a new crime, whereby contracts in restraint of “^rade are made
misdemeanors, and indictable as such. But the Act does net underta''-'e
to define 'what constitutes a contract, combina. ion
,
or ccnsplrac’' in
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restraint of trade, and reccnrse must therefore "be had to the ccrnmor
law for the prooer definition o.r* these general terms, and to ascer-
tain v/h-etaor the acts cliarp’ed come within the statute. The rule
amounts to this; the status of comhinat ions an 1 conspiracies in re-
straint of trade is the same under the Act as at common law; cC'^tracts
in restraint of trade become misdemeanors under the Act, w’'ereas at
common lav; they were unlav/ful merely.
The attitude of ti;e. court in the Trans -Hiss our i i'reigrht Associa-
tion Case when it vras tried in the District Court, 53 Fed. 440, is
particularly int eres t inp
,
because in that case the Suureme Court de-
cided on appeal, that the ^ct au_ lies to all restraints O'^ trade.
Hiner u. o. considered that the i-ct contemplated only these contracts
wiilcn are publicly oppressive and whatever restrictions are broader
than is necessary for the protection of the party
-to be benefited bi7
the contract. In such a case the contract is unreasonable an'’ void;
otnerv/ise it is not. Contracts havinf a direct tendency to prevent
healthy competition are include'^, but these orevent-nr unhealthy
competition are not affected. The contract inx^olved :‘n this case he
considered to be in the. latter class, and accord' no^ TffhViiri tv>^
purview of the Act.
;* •* ’
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' 2, The seccnd period: the period of rig’id irter oretat Ic n , 19°7-
1911, (from the Trans -llissouri Freight Association Case to the Stan-
dard Cil Case.). The line of demarcation hetv/een the ^'rst and seccns
periods is sharply drawn hy the decision in the Trans -Llin PO’^ri Freisrv^t
Association Case. It had been held in the Circuit Court o^ Appeals
that the Act does not apnly to all contracts in restraint of trade,
the court sayinf in sc many words: "A contract that clearl:/ restra-’ns
competition is not necessarily an illegal contract. ’’ Th-'s v/as now
over-ruled, and the separate points upon which the previous doctrine
was based v/ere criticized. The contention v;as made in this case,
as in most of the. earlier cases, that the title indicates the inclusion
of those contracts only which were unlawful at common law, on the
theory that V7hen terms bnown to the common law are used in a federal
statute, those terms are to be given the same meaninp- that th«y re-
ceived at common law. This propos i ^ on means that t>^e use O'^ t>"e
term ’’unlawful contracts” in the title o’’ the Act indicates t'^-at '’’•^e
statute was intended to apply ly to that class cf cc^tracts comm'nlf’
known as Unlawful contracts”, that is to say, to contracts held ''y
the com.mon law to be in unreasonable restraint c” trade. It woud'^
then follow that the use cf the words ’’every” and "all” in body
of the Act apply merely to such unreasonable contracts, a’^d
therefore, the Sherman Act is directed aga:*nst ever;'’ unlawful contract,
rather than against every contract restraint cf trade, regardl'^ss
of its status at common lav/. The court, however, declared that ^,he
language of the title refers to and inclu'des those contracts made
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fthe title acc-orllr.rl:: has reference tc ccntracts ma-ie nn" awful by
the statute itself and has no other connotation; the r.eaninr o-^ the
title is tc he -determined e:r:clusivel37 by resort tc the Act itselt’.
The court in this case also disposed o-^ an arg-uraent ccm-ncnly
advanced in support of the theory that the Act applies onl^^ to unr'-’as-
onable restraints, to wit, that "contract in restraint o^ tra^e" in
its common law meaning- includes unreasonable res'^’rai n'^s only, a^^ is
used in this sense in the statute. Under the in te-» pretati th^
court, the terra is not o'" such limited s i rni ""i ca’-^e : it inclin^’es all
binds of contracts which fact restra'^'n, cr nay restrain, '^rade.
ocme are void and unenforceable at common law, becaus* c" the u-ereasor-
ableness of the restraint, and some are valid because the contract
is net against public policy, but there is no direct rclat ic’-^s’-- ip be-
tween the validity of a contract and the degree to whic’' trade is
restrained under it. Ey the simple use o'" the terra "contract in re-
straint of trade", all contracts c" that nature, 7/h,et>"er vali'’ cr
otherwise, are included and '^he corararn law test o" iinreasonahleness
is of no moment. "7/h. en, t^ore^cre, the bo'ly c" an act pronounces as
illegal every contract cr corahina'^icn in restraint of trade cr conrerce
arnonf the several states, etc., the plain and ordinary raeaninr c" such
languag-e is not limited to that kind of contract alone 'whi^h is in
unreasonable restraint of t'-ade, but all contracts are included in such
language and no exception or limitation can be added, wither'^ placing
in the act that which has been omitted by Congress."
In spite of the rigidity of this view o" f-e Act, th° '’cur'* is
nevertheless obliged to admit that certain classes cf cc’-’tracts,
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Such a case for example mig-ht ho that a venlcr r prooort^’ afrees
with the vendee, that he wil'l net enter the same business within a
certain time or in a certain territory. 'Thile such ccntracts are
in the opinion of the court reasonably necessary for the benefit
trade and commerce, notwhithstanding- their desirability, the Act can
not be construed in their favor, without un ;’us tifiably reading- into
the text an exception. The court believes that when one- reasonable-
ness is made the criterion, the inevitable personal bias of the pre-
siding judge will interfere with the prep-r administration of 'I'he Act.
Furthermore, the court ashs
,
to whom would the rate be reasonable?
Llercly to the companies themselves I
In the ITorthorn Securities Case it was stated that among* the prin
ciples deducible from the cases decided under the Act, is this: that
V
the Act is not limited to restraints of Interstate and international
trade or commerce that are unreasonable in their nature, hut embraces
all direct restraints imposed hy any combination, conspiracy or
monopoly upon sucii trade or commerce. Brewer f. in his concurriro-
opinion refused to accept this statement". "Ee sa^^s t’*' t althoiKh t>-e
cases hitherto before the ccurt '^al been rightly decided, tte reasons,
given 'were in some respects wrong. '’Instead o*^ holding that the
Anti-Trust j^ct included all contracts, reasc/.alle cr unreasona"^^l e in
restraint of interstate trade, the ruling should have been that t^e
contracts there presented were unreasonable restraints o'’ interstate
trade, and as such within the scope of the Act. That Act, as appears
from its title, v/as leveled at only unlawful restraints and monopo-
lies. Congress did not intend to reach and destroy those miner
contracts in partial restraint of trade 7;hich the long course of
?0 6«f;Tp'2cA«&Sfi'':rtBe t " (j- ^ •didV|> ffii'
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deciaicxja at coriimon law had affirmed were reascrahle and to
he upheld." Ee insists that whenever a departure '"rom commcn law
rules and definitions is contemplated, the pnrpcse to ma'^re the depar-
ture should he clearly shov;n; t^-'at such a purpose dees nc“^ ap;'.>ear an'^
such a departure was not intended.
in the Swift Co. Case the court followed the current doctrine that
no consideration of reasonableness is presented under the Sherman Act,
and attempted to formulate a test to determine the application of the
Act. V/ith this in view, it declared that whatever cornhins t Icn has
the direct and necessary effect of restricting competition, s re-
straint of trade in the sense intended hy Cc^f^ress. This test may
he considered the prevailinf one durl'-p -^is period, althcurh in
some eases it was attempted to srhstitute the question whether *he
restraint at har directly af’^ected interstate commerce. Under this
latter test, any restraint 7/hich directly and necessarily affected
commerce between the states cr with foreign nations was ec ipso
within the statute.
3. The third period: the period of liberal interpretation,
1911 to date. (From the United States v. Standard Oil Co. 221 U. S.
1 to date.) The Standard Oil Case marhs the dopartn.re of the Supreme
Court from its previous adherence to the doctrine that each an'' every
restraint of trade is within the -^ct and begins a new period of inter-
pretation, in which the predominant question in' any case is ‘he in-
herent reasonableness of the restraint. The Qoiirt attempts to con-
ceal the abruptness of the departure from the prevailinr doctrine hy
endeavoring to reconcile all previously decide' cases as far as
possible, and by refusing to state in so manv w;ords f-at it has revert'-i^
to doctrines advaiiced by the lower courts immediately after passage
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of the Act. L'evcrti.elea^
,
on compfarison of the rnlef? cf law laid
down in the cases of the successive periods, it must he saind that the
present attitude of the Supreme Court is practical] ^ that o'^ the Dis-
trict and Circuit Courts of the first period, and that the rip-id doc-
trines cf the second period have heen discarded once and for all.
In spite of the assertions of Chief Justice V/hite that all cases under
the Act are reconcilable, with the possi'''le eTcceptior of the Freirht
Cases, the old tests direct res‘'^raint on competition or on inter-
state commerce, no long-er have a controllinp place in federal law.
In the Standard Oil Case, V/hite C. J. considers at lenp-th •’’he
historical development cf restraint of trade both in Fnfland and the
United State,s, and conclueds that the Question of reasonableness is cf
importance for the f'ollowinr reasons:
ihe statute was drawn in the lip-ht cf e-xistinr practical concep-
tions cf the law of restraint of trade. This is so, because monopclVs
'Which in practice had come to be considered as "in restraint cf trade
in the broad sense, are p-rcuped with technical restraints and are in-
cluded within the same class.
The language cf the Act is made sc all-embracing in order that no
undue restraint should escape its application. The sweeping nature
of the language contemplated the inclusion of every type O"^ unlawful
restraint cf trade, rather than cf every restral^^t as such.
As contracts are not expressly defined, freedom to contract is the
essence of freedom from undue restra’rt on the right to contract. It
fellows that the contention that the statute includes all contracts in
restraint cf trad^e is unjustifiable, because every contract would be
included, or if any distinction were made, it would be impossible to
3fa/)o ftiu. . ,’ .
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V
frame accurate and definite criteria. instead of earlier tests, he
states that the criteria for violations of the i^ct must be "t^^e rule
of reason chided by the established law and the plain duty to en-^orce
the prohibitions of the Act'*. The two sections c-^ the /-.ct supplement
each other and the test for each must be t’le same. It would seem to
folic/; from this statement of the present test, that the ’’rule o^ reas-
on guided by the established law” can be no other than the rule
of the common law that restraints of trade are to be examined in -^he
light of the comparative benefit to the parties and detriment tc the
public; and that monopolies are tc he ;iudfed in accor'^ance with +h^'
improper enjoyment of a righ.t hy ofae and the exclusion c'^ prblic
from such enjoyment. This proposition is s t reng"- ’^ene'-’’ i-y 'h-* lang-
uage 6f the court in United "*-ates v. American Tobacco Co., 221 I . S.
1C5, v/hero the **rule of reason” is emphasire^, an! further stress is
laid on pre-existing standards of the common law, although as yet t^'e
Court has refused to declare iii terms that common lav/ decisions are bin 'i
iiig upon it in its ixiteroretat ion of the statute.
in the Standard Oil Case, Harlan f. recognized the fact tV at the
former rule of the Supreme Court in t>'e Freiglit Association an 1 Joint
Traffic Cases v/aa overtlircv/n by the decision o'’ the majority of '‘h<?
Court, and sharply criticized the. departure. '7hile concurri’^g with
the actual decision in the case, he dissented from the reasoninr of the
court on the ground that it is bound by the previous cases, and further -
'^more he objected to the proposed ’’rule of reason”, because he antici-
pated as many ’’reasonable'* theories as courts and juries.
Economic Tffect of Chanf ing Interpretations. T^" e history of the
interpretation of the Sherman Aet is o"’’ prime imuortance i’- ''^et ^'-rmin
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ting th--' value oC the statute, ant the necessity '’cr its aner^rr.^rt or
repeal. It has heen ar^'uei hy thi“ rppcre’rf's the Ac+, it has
accomplished rcthiny for i?hich it v/as intended; that is, has ro"^
benefited the trust situation in the United States, but has rather
tended to complicate an already serious problem. Cn this account
it io regularly proposed that a bill be substituted '’or it wh.'^rein
every contract shall be described in terms 6o definite that there
shall be no doubt whether th- given case falls v/ithin the statute or
not. Such a bill wrould certainly accomplish much, if it should
bring about the intended result, but it seems highly improhahle t^at
this would be the case. Any attempt to bring broad and diverse
matters of law ..ithin one statute, specifyirp' lb detail t>^e particu-
lar instances to which such statute shall apply, necessarily implies
a period of douht and uncertainty before t>'e final meaning of the
law can be settled by the Supreme Court, However carefully +he hill
is drawn there must be in it certain words anl p’'^r5ses whlc^ must be
judicially defined in their relation to tbr* rew legislation
,
before
the business interests of the country can rely upon it an'i gov'‘rn
conduct accordingly. i^’urthermore
,
it should be remembered that
Sherman Act has been interpreted in three different ways s-ii^ce enXft-
ment and that it is only v/ithin the last tv/o years that it heenj
definitely settled that only unreasonable ccntr?cts are contemplate'^.
The interpretation of the Sherman Act, then, has at last heceme defin-
ite and certain; hut any new statute 7/oul 1 have to pass t^'ronp-h an unsa
isfactory period of ccnstn:cticn such as that from 7/hlch the Anti-Trus
Act has just emerged. V/hen the additional fact is ta>en into ac-
count, that any enumeration of particular instances to which a law
ra€>viw' '^* '" ‘ „' ^ •, ,-•-" "''.:!a*‘ *'-«' . •• ‘V*-- ' f '' •’»^ rf J... . '« .*' «•-' 3,r'' ' .*
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{shall apply will prohahly prove ur sat isfactcry , the lexical treataort
of the matter requires that the existing- Act should not he disturbed
unless it is actually vicious either in its manner of interiire tat ion or
in the subject matter te which it applies.
Is the Sherman ^ct, then, vicious in either o'f’ •^hese respe^-ts?
ii.s nov/ interpreted, it rests on broad doctrines 0“^ the common law, test-
ed by successive g-enerat ions
,
and Justified by the experien'^e c the
Anglo-Saxon race. Again, the present interpr^tat Icn reflects t’-^e in-
tent of the framers of the Act, and apnll^s exa'^tly to t’-'ose cla^'ses
of cases which Congress had in mind wd^en tv-e Aet was passed. Hence-
forth it can never seriously I'e argued that ahsolutel” e^e-ry eentract
directly restraining interstate comm.erce is within ,t’"e purview; ei't'-er
of the language of the Act or of the legislative intention. The same
principles which have guided English policy in regard to unlawful re-
straints and monopolies are nor; incorporated into the corpus iurls o-^
the United States, and It may reasonably be expected ‘hat ‘he same sat-
isfactory results 7;ill occur in this country as have already ta'^’en place
in England, when once sufficient time has elapsed after the new inter-
pretation of tile ^ct for the business interests to understand their
position before the law and to enter into their cc ntracts and feom.bi-
nations in accordance with it. Those contracts and combinations are
I>rohibited, which are unreasonable; t'-^e '’unreasonableness.” is that
of the common law; and the principles of ti e common law are de-^inite
and admit of no doubt as to thei^r meaning. Since tv- is is so, is it
not better to build the business o^* ""he nation on ‘T'es® wnll -tes'*'<=>d
rules of law, rather tiian to ”crce ti-o m.anu ^ac’-uner and ccuntr-"
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Restraint of Trade un'ler the Act . An^ analvsis or^'t^ria o'’
rules affecting contracts in restraint of traie, must le na'i^ with
qualifications dependinfr on the attitude of the Gcurt towards ^he
internretatiun of tiie Sherman Act; that is to say, the period in which
the £-iven decision was made must he taT'en into account, and *he 7/*ight
of the decision vvill necessarily he modi'^ied therehTr. ?or example,
statements of jud£-es in regard to rules ccncerninp competition v/ili he
X
of greater authority, if cnade after the decision in the Standard Oil
Case than if r.naJe during the preceeding period, v;h.en any direct re-
straint on compet itieu among the states v;as aupposedlh’ the test of *he
application of the statute. xc this proposition, the Supreme Court of
the United States refuses to assent; yet it must neverf'^^less he true
in large measure, since the gist of tVe Act has been considered to he
one thing in one period and another thing in the next. During ^irst
period, common la7/ principles v/er-' rerc/-d‘>‘d as importan* rul^p '’or '^•e
decisions under the ^^ct; during the second perirsd, t’-':' direc^ ef'^ect
on interstate commerce, or the ''’•’’rec' e^'^ect on compct it ’ on in in'*‘'^r-
state commerce, was considered, to he the rigid test where'^y th'^ g-^^'en
contract must stand or ‘all, and in the third period th*^ court returned
tc the e:;amination cf the common la.v
,
as emhcdyin*'- the principles c'’
the federal ^ict. The Supreme Court in -the Standarl Cil Care stated
that in laying dc7/n the "rule c'’ reason’’ it di'’ net over-rule an'^
the proceeding cases, and it also attempted to reccnclle them wit^ the
common law and with each ether. This was rendered plausible h-- ':he
theory that all cases at bottom rested • n the rule that cnl’’ unreason-
able ci^ntracts were contemplated by the x*ct, but that in the given
cases where no mention of this fact was made the court decide
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face sc T3nreas enable as to preclu’^.e^'that the contract at bar was cn its
the necessity for discussion cT this point. This statement t^-e
Supreme Court, however, must he rec-arded as an attempt to soften the
abruptness of its departure from the prevailing doctrine ra-^her
than as a declaration of the actual law. The decisicnj? in the earlier
cases thus attempted tc be reconciled, flatl" lay down •^he rule that
the Sherman Act is absolutely independent of any cuestlcn reason-
ableness in the restraint of trade, and t^e wcrd‘’''ir those '’eeis'cns
is c-enerally entirely inconsistent rit^ any latent idea in the mind of
the court t^.at the ’’rule of reason” played any part in "-he determina-
tion of liability.
,
The Supreme Court itself was forced to reeopnize
this fact in some of the m.ore important cases, nctahly those of -^he
Freight Association and the- Joint Traffic Association, ar.'-’ stated at
these 7/ere valid or:ly in so far as they decided that nc d’^seues’C" o'’
reason in the e ntracts before them was necessary, since the contract
was obviously v/ithin the statute.
(Vhile this attempt at recenci li aticn • was undoubted ly praiseworthy
in order that the unity of the law might not be disrupted, it neverthe-
less introduces difficulties into the ])resent interpretat ion . '?efe it
not for this justification of preceedinr cases, the .judgment in tv.^
Standard Oil Case would amo'urt i o a decision that the Sherman Act is
simply an incorporation the comi^cn law into t’r^ statute la^, with a
few modifications to be expected t’rcmi tVe -"erm remedy alon'!‘ed, d
from the then existing stat-"' of nriblic pcli'^y. Put ’ t '^ol''ows
V
*
the approval of preceeding cases, that the various i neens ist»r "• stat**-
ments in them miist be r'^garded mere or less as aut^cri tati
,
exc^u'*'
in sc far as the^/ directly deny tho rule of reasonable cons t riiet ion
.
This means that for seme time to ceme the vericus rules of ccm.pe^iticn
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''and direct restraint ./ill 'e cited as cf seme anthcrit:/, in ^.hc
cases l)erore the ccurts
,
a..d it is tc be expected th nt seen time mnrt
elapse before they are finally e liaioatec! . ITeyert’'oloss
,
it is trae
that there is an appreciably increasinr tenlor.c" tc ar£-T:e cases on
their common lav; merits, and it is reascnal 1” to be anticipated
that in t'ne near future, ti;C entire los omachj/ c" ru]-s o ” cemp^tttoon
and direct restraint v;ill be 'iscardo-!’
,
and tliat the Supreme Court
will decide is terms tliat common lav. criteria are those ccntemplated
by tee Ac t
.
General and Partial Restraliits of Trade under ti.e Ac t. In the Trans
-
Idissouri I’reight .n.ssociation Case,- 5.'5 i''’ed , 440, previous to t^e ri^id
inter -/retat io n in the Supreme Court, rest ra‘’nt.s cf "'.rade '.V'''re classi'^ied
much cas at common lav/. General restraints were declare" to be bad,
whereas particular restraints elt'-“er in respect tc tira':' or "lace are
to be determined by their reascr.a'^ Icness and the pros nee cons'’'d-
eration to support the contract. -In the viev/ cf '^ourt no more
definite line cf reasonableness can be drawn than this: ”V/here the
contract is publicly oppre.ssive and the restrictions broader t^an are
neces.sary for the protection cf the ether party to be benefited
the contract, then the contract is unreasc nabd e and vci^, otherwise
it is not. This is true cf centra *3 having a direc' tendency to
prevent healthy competition hut it is not so with those preventiny
unhealthy compet it don . ” This court then hclis that the rules of
restraint of trade under the statu'tc are practically tl'e same as V^'ose
at common law: the detriment tc the public and the benefit to t’'>e
t'riC validitr s/ich ci’vr tracts.parties constitute trie tests for y ST err
^ ,I r ‘ ;'3i, ttojn^Oiv ' /
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^ The evils of restraints of trale anl their historical le’^-lopmen
t
v/ere discussed at leng-t': hy the l07/er court in "^he ca e o:^ I’nlted ''•*a*e
V. Addyston Pipe £. 3teel Company, 35 Fed. 296. '’1. Such ccntracts
injure trje parties rnal^inp- them, hecauso they dininish t’^eir means
procuring' a livelihood, and a competence for th.eir families. They
tempt improvident persons, for the sa-^e of present pain, to deprive
themselves of the po"/er to malre future acquis iticn, and they expose
such persons to imporition and oppression. 2. They tend to deprive
the public of the services of men in the emplcym''nt and capac i es in
V7hich they may he most useful to the community as 7;ell as themselves.
.5. They disccur6.pe industry: an^ enterprise, and diminish t’--e produce
of ingenuity and shill. 4. They preveri^. competition and enhance
prices. 5. They expose the public to all the evils c f .monopoly .
"
The court considers that contracts in restraint of tra'^e are a'^
present lawful if they arc made by the seller of a business vhc agrees
not to compote in such a '.vay as to hurt the value ci^ v'nat was sold;
by a retiring partner, net to compete with the ^irm; by a partner u'^nd-
in^ the partnership, not to hurt '"he firm; by a bu:’er, nc"^ to use the
property bought so as to compote with that retained by the seller; b 7/
a servant, net to compete after t’lo time of service. fever the"' es s
,
it must be feund that those contracts are reasonably necessary to the
enjoyment of the subject matter of the contract, and that the;; contem-
plate legitimate ends, such as tl:e prevention of injurv, or protection
from loss to the business. The main uurucse must in every case be one
of these, and the covenant in restraint ancillary merely, and not ex-
ceeding the necessity. This doctrine of "he lo7;er court is the more
interesting because in tills case on appeal th.e rule o’d direct restraint
L
J\i/as 3 ul)ii t i tutea for it ani all cues tiers of reasoraller ^“SS ])i]t asile.
x’nis cornfacn law in terpretat lor of nontraPts in resti'aint tra '^e
is a^'ain apparent in the cases lecilerl a'^ter the Ttaniari Oil Case,
ij’or example, in Union Pacific Coal Company v. United States, 173 Pei.
737, it v/aa said; ”If the necessary effect of combination to enfape in
or conduct interstate or international commerce is but incidentally
and indirectly to restrict competition therein, while its ebie-^ re-
sult is to foster the trade and to increase the b-'i'^iress O'® t'^-cse •'^bc
malce and operate it, it does not fall under the ban of this law."
The question has repeatedly been raised whether the size of "^be
combination restraining interstate com-'crce is to be ta^^en into consid-
eration in determining the legality of its contracts. In the Swift
Case there seem to be intimations t^at this is the case; but w’enev-r
counsel have attempted to argue on this point, -sueb an In terpretat ion
of the statute has promptly been discouraged. The preser'*' rule 'S
apparerU ly that the volume business in itsel'^ is no criterion, ’’'u'^
that it may indicate a restraint which would net be possible wfere it no t
for the size of tne interests of the concern. Of itsel-^‘, -^be restraint
may apply only to a small portion interstate com.merce, and still be
within the prohibition of the statute. Steers et al. v. U. 3. 192
Ped. 1.
At one tir e an attempt v;as made to 'listinruisb between restraints
in staple commodities and in others. In his dissentinp" coin ’ on i’^
the Trans -Ivlissouri Case, Shiras P. urged in the Circuit Court c® Ap-
peals the common law distinction "'etween t’-'.e t^^'o "’"’n-^s c® restrain'*',
claiming that all restraint is prohibited in th^ case staple* cemmodi
ties, and that transpertat ion is so analagcus to these cemmodi es that
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it shoiili fall within th<? samr rule. This attempte'1 distinction
not ra-iet with favor, possihly for tho r^^ason that inmo'^ ia^. o 1:/ a-^t^r
this statomont the rnlo was adopted t^at the Sherman Act applies to all
restraints regardless of their natnre. Under the rec'*nt dec's ''Cns,
however, the question may well come up for liscussion again . It
was undoubtedly^ true that ' t common law all restraints in staple com-
modities were prohibited, on the grouni that public policy demanded
absolute freedom of traffic and exchange in the necessit-'es c:'* li'^e.
As the Sherman ^ct more and mere approximates the common law in its
essential elements, it may le that the courts will be called upon to
decide -whether the public policy of the present -lay demands the same
distinction. Certainly there is an opportunity '"or argument, along
these lines, and it seems preba' le that before long the problem m.us'''
be decided.
The P.ule of Direct Idestraint, xLfter the decisions in the freight
Cases that the Sherman -.xct includes all contracts in restraint of trade
regardless of tlieir inherent reasonableness, it became neressarv t'^.at a
test be found which aliould determine the application c'’ th® Act to any
given case. Common lav/ prii.ciples being no longer available, the
courts were obliged to form-'.^late their own gpides for the c< nstruction
of the Act. Several such rules "/ere offered, the cr’.ie-^ of v/hich must
be considered tlie doctrine that if the contract in question dlrec-^dy
affects interstate commerce, it is v/ithin the scope of the Act. Under
this interpretation the important fact to be determined In an;/ restrain t
concerns the directness with v/hich the contract implicates interstate
commerce. If it is shov/n that the interstate character of the com-
merce is nedessarily involved by the restraint and that It 1s directly
LTBP tftrrTi -^i-^ rtrcYn •''f ‘^'t*
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affected thereby, then the restraint is illeral. If, however, the
restraint is ancillary merely, that is to sa^/, if a contract involvlnp
interstate commerce incidentally puts some restraint upon it, then it
''s valid unless this incidental restraint is carried so far as to amount
practically to a regulation of it. In the Addystcn Pipe & St^el Case
it. was said on appeal that i^ an agreement or comhinaticn directlv
restrains net only the manufacture but the purchase, sale, or reehan^e
of the manufactured commodity among- the several states it is th^-n
brought within the provisions of the statute since the ef-^’ect is to
regulate commerce. In United States v. Ghesapeahe and Ohio Fuel Co.,
105 Fed. 93, the question of the ancillary nature of the restraint
there in issue -was discussed and the court confirmed +he theory that
the proper test of ^he Act is the neces -ary and dir'»ct e-^^ect upon
commerce. In Standard fil Case, 173 Fed. 177, J. ccn?-’‘.d®rs that
this test of the direc"^ and appreciable e-^^^ct c-^ an^r giyi^n restraint
is the only proper one, and he -^avors tt as oppos-^d to the "rul^
reason” on the ground that c ions of reasona'^deness are foe
diverse t: form a stable an i uniform rule for the construction o” f^e
statute
.
The Hule of Cempotition. During the period of rigid interpretation
,
besides the rule of direct restraint above sot forth, the courts
attempted to formulate a rule c competition, v/hich some considered
a supplement to it, and which others advanced as a substitute ^or it.
This rule is a direct outgrowth c'* the statement o^ the Cupreme Court
in United States v. Trans -Ilissouri Freight Association Case 166 U. S.
290 to the effect that the act of Congress is aimed at all restric-
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ness cf such restriction. The Court considered that it V7as evidently
the purpose of the law to perrr.it cemrr.- rce 'bet7/e‘"n the states to flow
in its naturii channels, unrestricteci any cornhi nat io^s
,
^entrants
or conspiracies, or mcnopclies wha tsc '^'ver
.
Adopting this vi'ev;, the court in the I.'orthern
.
Securi t i es Case said
that the mere existence cf such a ccmt inat ion as that at tar, and tV'
power acquir d ty the holding ccmpari.7 as its trustee, constituted a
menace to, and a.r-straint upon, that freedom cf cc'mmerce which Ccne-ress
intended to recognize and protect, and which the public is entitled tc
have protected. It furthermore ccnsld'-^rod that «very ccrnhinrticn or
conspiracy which would extinguis’e competition in interstate trade or
commerce and which would in that way restrain such tra^e or commerce,
was illegal under the Act. Sc clearl:* did the court hold th-o to he
the rule that it stated in terms f^at the rule ^or internaticral and
interstate commerce adopted ry the Trans -!.Ii sscuri Fre'ph+ Apscca ia^i cn"
Case was that it should not le vexed ty ccmtinatic’'S
,
ccnspirae-? rp
or mcncpclies which restrain commerce ty destroying or restr-'c^lrr 1t.
lieither did it consider that any constitutional right, such as the
guarantee cf liberty of c-'ntract 7/as .iecpardized under such a rul®,
since free competiticn must its ver7' na't'ure ^ac'! litah*^ ‘®r*'edom. c"^
contract. Eclmes T., however, re'^used tc ass<'*nh to this t'-’ocr-'’ on
logical ground that the statute says nc^hirir about competiticn and cnl"-'
refers to those contracts and ccmtinations in res'^raint c^' trad^ w/h-ich
do in fact restrain it, regardless o' the .way in which such restraint
comes about. He significantly pc'rts out that a vccntract may d'^rive
its charaet-r as restraining trade from other features thtn the
suppression cf competition slcne.
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The rule of competition met with incroasj'nf favor in t^® 3^ears
V
following the decision in the ITcrthern Securities Sase, an i at t^e
time when the Standard Oil Case was deoiled it seemed that thdo rule
had already heen definitely’’ incorporated into the Sherman xlct. At
that time the general theory seemed to he as stated in the case
United States v. Llac-Andrews L i^’orhes Company et al
,
149 Ued. 922: ’’Re-
straint, combination and monopoly is to he determined hy the effect on
interctate commerce, which need net he a total suppression O'^ tra-e,
nor a complete monopoly', hut is sufficient if the necessary operation
tends to suppress competition, and to restrain interstate commerce.”
In the Standard Oil Case Itself, in the lower court fl73 Fed. 177) it
was held that the purpose of the statute was to ’’"eep th** rates o-^ trans
portation and t e prices of articles in interstate and international
commerce open to free competition. Any contract or comhiration of
tvi/c or more parties whereby the control of such rates or prices, is
tak.n from sey^arate competitors in a given trade and ’’ested in a per-
son or an association of pec sons, in the opinion of th* court necessari
ly restricts competition and restrains commerce i'- sense intended
by the Act.
Since the decision of the Supreme Court in tV’e Standard Oil Case,
the irnucrtance of the rule of comuetition ^as h^’^en greatl"'^ lessened, al
though as it v;as net definitely repudiated in th&t Case it nevertheless
must be still regarded as an ancillary criterion for the det er'^ina’’ ion
of the application of the ^et. The cases decided in the present per-
iod recognise that the rule of ccm^>etiticn cannot be cited with the
authority which it formerly possessed; many of them hove staged de-
finitely that provisions making a combination illegal do not make
every combination unlawful on account of the fact that competition is
thereby restrained, but recopnize that there ca- bec a restraint com-
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.bf.ni-o .taot " J-:. is^i
petitioi] v7hich ia net v/ithin the rceanin£- of the Act. Unlte'1 States
V. I. Jupont de ITeciours L Go. et al, 1S8 fed. 127.
The Hiile of Reason
.
The earlier tests as to the meaning of the Act
were repudiated hy the decision in the Standard Gil Case eiscept in so
far as they can he brought into harmony with the rule there adopted, to
the effect that common law principles of reasonableness and unreasonable-
ness are the tests by which restraints c " trade are to he judged. Chief
Justice White reasons that inasmuch as the term "contracts'^ is not
expressly defined, "it inevitahly fcllov/s that the prevision necessari-
ly called for the exercise c-" judgment which recuired that some stan-
dard should be resorted to for the purpose of determini rr whether
the prohibitions cen talced in the statute had or had net in any p’iven
case been violate'. Thus nc"^. specifyin?" but indubitably contemnlat ing
and requiring a standard, it follows that it was intended that the
standard of reason which had been applied at the common law and in this
country in dealing;- ;vith subjects of the character embraced by the
statute, was intended to be the measure used for the purpose of deter-
mining wiietiier in a £iven case, a particular act had or had net brought
about the wrong against which the statute provided". Hence although
the Ghiei Justice does not say that the common law must be regarded as
the test for the Sherman Act, and although he avoids the statement that
the validity of a contract at comrnen law is the same as that under t> e
i».ct
,
it seems to follow from the language of this quo tat ion, that the
^ul® Ox reason" is tne sarne rule reason that has long been d'l^oy/n
to Anglo-Saxon common law. This conclusion is the more necessary be-
cause it offers the only means of escape frorr. that indefiniteness of




the common law is made the test of ruesticn is not
1
left to the individual ccnsciences of judfe and dury hut rests or, nre-
cedents as formally established as those in ary other branch law.
Reason then becomes synonymous with ’’that which hss beer 'leclde'T to be
reasonable” and not with the ccrcepticn o:^ reascnableres? h^l^ by an
individual or a g-roui') os individuals.
Intent undey the Act. Cuesticns '-ave at time? >°en raised in actions
brought under the statute, regardinf the necessity for proo-^ o-^ in^-nt .
Defendants have oceasicnally urged the -^act that as thi? t? a crtmiral
statute, the rule of the criminal law, that act and i’-tent must agr^^e,
is valid and that actual proof of intent must be offerred in order
to secure a ccnvictier under the penal provisions of the Act. This
contention has net been received as of rnijch importance, however, since
while it is admitted to be true, it is bold under the Act to amount
to a rule of pleadinr, rather than of positive law. In re Corning
51 Red. 205. This results from the fact that under the present don-
structicn of the statute, intent is deduciblo frolin the act, and that It
is useless for a defendant to say that he did not intend to regulate or
affect interstate commerce. The intention to mabe the very combina-
tion or agreement which in fact is made in any given case, 'S held to
contemplate its necessary and direct results. U. . v. Adlyston
ripe A Steel Go. 175 U. S. 211.
Conspiracy under the Act
.
In the case c conspiracy prohibited hy the
Act, an interesting cuesticn arises as to the necessity ^or an overt
act. The ordinary offence of conspiracy U'^der the federal law must
be accompanied by an overt act according to Rev. 3t . 5440. But u’^dAr
the Sherman Act it has been held that no overt act is necessary, t’-e
conspiracy itself bel-.g the offence, as at common ^aw, U. v.
Kissel et al. 173 Red. 323. This case discusses the offence of con*^
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to the valid decision re^ardinr tb^ ov-rt act, it wae ^^eld in thr. lov7-
er court that a conspiracy in restraint of trade is notbinc' a '^on-
tract or af^reement between two or core persons in restraint of trade.
This definition of conspiracy in restraint of trade was not accepted on
appeal, however, where the court declared that such conspiracies are
different from and more than contracts in restra-int o^ trad»» . ”A coi”-
spiracy is constituted by an a£"reement, it is true, but it is the re-
sult of the ag’reement, rather than the arreement itself, Just as a part
nership, althcu^rh constituted by a contract, is not the contract, but
is a result of it. A consx^iiracy is a partnership in' criminal purnose”.
Monopolies under the Act
.
aS a preliminary tc a discussion, of the
meaning; of monopolization under the Sherman Act it must be stated that
the mere size of a combination has, cf itsel-^ nct’.inp- to do wif^. its
legality. In re freene 52 red. 104. T’^e mere e:ztent c:^ accu'’ s i ion
of business or iproperty achieved by fair and law^ud means cannot
be the criterion o-^* monopoly with in the meaning o'* the Act. In addi-
tion to acquisition and acquirement there must ''^e an intent ’•o e:z-
clude others "rorr. the traffic or ’-usiness invcl’’-ed^ an^ this un-
lawful means. T. S. v. heading; Co. 13<'3 Fed. 461.
In the Oreene case the court considered that a monopoly •in”cl''’'es
the element of an exclusive privilege cr grant which restrains ethers
from the exercise of a right or liberty which thov possessed be-^cre
the monopoly was secured. In the law of commerce, ^it is necessarily
an abuse of the freedom of that commerce, by which one or mere I’^div-
iduals have procured the advantage of sellinr alone, e::clus ively
,
all
of a particualr kind cf merchandise or commodity, to the detrirr" nt cf
V
the public. The court discusses the com.mcn alw form ol monopoly as
expounded by Blacks tone, 4 Tl . Comm. 159, and by Cc''^e , 3 Co. Inst. 137,
which is a grant from the sovereign power cf the state by concession
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tc a person cr ccrporatibr, nr^er
the rrantee obtains the exclusive ri^ht 'bupi’^f ,, selling , ma’-inp, or
using the suh.ject matter of the rrant . Tv;o elenents are inolur'ed:
an exclusive rig-ht or privilege on t)ie one sine, an’’ a restriction or
restraint on the other, v/hich operate to prevent the exercise of a
rig"ht or liberty formerly open tc the public, The court i’^timatei
that these elements of privilepe and restraint still existed in t^'e
lav; of monopoly at the time of its decision and that accordinrly an
exclusive right in a portion of trade cr commerce must be secure'^' by
means which prevent cr restrain others from engaging therlr. In order
to bring the case within the provisions of the statute. This doctrine
besides eliminating the necessity fcr a grant "rcm the scvereirn, intro
duces an element not emphasi:jed at common law, namely, the means which
bring about the exclusion of the public at large from tra-^fic in ^’-e
monopolized article. This question of the m.eans w^'ereby otber.o ere
/
excluded from the enjoym.ent of the nre-existi’^g rirht may be considered
The Gist of I'.’onopolizat icn
.
In the Standard Oil Case, 17? Fed. 177,
the District Court intim;ated that the acqu i r^m^'n'*- '^he entire ^rade
in a certain commcdlty by a single person cr corucrat i
,
is not f-e
essential element of the unlawfulness o"^ the morcpo'’’', bn*. t^e com
bination and conspiracy to secure the trade ma'''''e it illegal. T^is is
so because everv sale and transuortat ion is insofar •^cr1 b moro’-cli ea'^ ieei
because it is an exclusi\”e enjo^/ment of the benefits of ^be given sale
or carriage, and the statute must be construed to abate a m.i s
-
chief, not to interfere with such legitimate operations.
Accordingly the combination and the crnsp'’iracy wbicb in t^em.s«*l ves
constitute illegal means must be considered to m.a’^e the transaction
illegal, w’nenever it Is so found to be. In the 7/ords Foo’’^ J. ”To
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sist of acts or ccninct y/hicb the la?; condemns and tb^ h^^ne^it o^ ^hich
if
if set in a civil cenrt o^ ;jicstice, conl^. not he obtained." T-oncpoliza
tion ccntern-plates the emplopnent o"^ means which prevent others ^rcm.
engaging- in fair cernoet it ic r, , snch as the engressinr o^ trad«, ard
the like. The es.vential idrca cf monopoly thus seems to ^e much the
same as at comr.on lav;, wi'h this difference: That whereas the right
enjoyed was made exclusive in the older lav; ty a grant from the sover-
eign, under the Sherman Act it hecemes exclusive hy the use o'’ unlawful
means
.
Tlie lifficulty in letermining the meaninr o'* monopcl” under the
Act rests on the fact t};at it is a cuesticn o'’ cons ideralile de'^icacy
to decide exactly v/hat unlawful means in the ; iven case may he. In
general, ttie unlawful means need not he condemned hy the c iminal law,
nor need they be such that a civil suit for damages m.igVt grow ont of
their use, but it is sufficient if their validity would net he recog-
nized in a civil case at lav; or in ecuity. Thus the -^act that +h^
several acts by which the purpese of ihe m.oncpcl’'’ is attained, are la^'-
fui in character v/hen taken in isclaticr,
,
dees rc^ r^^lieve *hf>^ -^rem
illegality when viewed as elem.onte of *he whcl«^, i unla-v^ul i ^^e
light cf their purpose and effect in combination
.
.
U. S. v. heading
Go. 133 Fed. 461. ITeithcr must prices be directly affected by such-
unlawful manipulations of commerce, but it is suf'^icient i the pcv;er
to control the price of a commodity exists, whether it is ex'^rcised or
not, U. 3. V, Patten et al
,
1S7 Fed. 644.
Public Policy and Monopolies. Owing to the i nde ‘’i niten®ss wi^ieh
arises from the fact that "unlawi^ul means" ar<^ not su'^cept ibl® o
a
hard and fast (ieflnition which s’’^oul'’ de*" 'rmi n'=' 'd'e'’‘r nature airairy
case, from an examination cf * he acts t’-emselves, the status
.he means employed mu. be ‘^pendent to certain extent
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upon the general public policy cf the ti^re in ’.7hich the-j are usel.
’.Vith this in view, V/hite J. in tlie 3tanlara Cll Case spo'S'e a' length on
the evils of monopolies, an<l the dangers '=hnich "they cff'er at the pre-
sent time. He consid-^rs that they are lively to he isad'’’an tageOu? "^o
the public in three respects: first, tne monopelv is able to
price and offer the article for sale at a rate di s'nropcr'^ io'^ate ,tc
its actual value. Secondly, production can re irrite'-'’ >^y a "C’^C’cl”
sc that highest returns accrue to the ccmbinaticr, au'-i the p-’ihlio sit^-
fers on account of the artificial restriction. Thirdly, the mcnopoliz
ed article is likely to deteriorate in Quality; when once -^he -timulus
cf cornpe t i t T or is removed an' a mart'-'-* as?'-ir", f'^e standard o-^ e^:cell-
ence tends to fall.
Considering that the pu'^l'c -must be proterted from these lang'^rs,
the illegality cf the means which are employed c secure the exclusive
trade in a commodity must be more or less lependont upon the likeli-
hood cf their injuring the public in one or mere c the ways stated.
In the or. inicn of Chief Justice 'Jhite, nc hard and '^ast rule can he
laid down in this respodt and he acccrllnrly states t'-^at the second
section cf the Act mu.'t be examined in tl’e same l''r’”t as ’ e -irs*, to
which it is suo lemontary. Hence t; -^ollows t’-a^ '^I'e cr-tcrio’" of
this section is the ’’rule cf reason guile'', "rrr t’--’*^ established lavs and
the dutj^ to enforce the proh"' b - 1 io'~s the ^ct . ”Un law'^ul m'^sns”,
then, must be determined not only from an examinFjtlcn cf '’ec'’‘ded oasi^s,
but with reference to t-he state cf public policy at tho tire.
Attempts tc I.Ionopc lize
.
The provision cf the Act against attempts to
monopolize i': terstate trrde an 1 commerce was in issue in '7^
1
v.
The Continental Tobacco Co., 125 Fed. 254, 7/here •'"he case arcse with-
out reference to any actual monopc licat ion , The cues^ ior
7/hether every attempt to mcnepolize any part of interstate

7^
commerce is unlawful, was raised, and was necessarily decided in terms,
1
since there was no contention on the part of the rcvernm.ont that any
other prevision of the act w’as involved. The Court held that i-^ •^his
question should decided in the affirmative, then every sa1'=’ int^r
state cemmeree is unlawful, as it is a success'^ul attempt to mcncpcl’ze
that part of commerce which ccncerns that sale. Th ’’ ? surelv was net
intended, because attempts hp osoi^ ecmpe'!’ t ot tc mcncpcl^ze a part
trade is the rcct cf compet it icr
,
and as such attempts are frus'^rat'^'^
,
then cempetitien ceases. The purpose c •' heth sections c the .A.n'’’i-
trust Act in the view cf the court and cf the Supremie Court at that
time, is to help ccmpetiticr. and accordinfly no centract is dercunoed
unless the effect is to restrict competition. In f^e case at bar
the sole cause cf action was a refusal tc sell tc the plair.ti^-^ a^d in
the view cf the court the d-fendart owed nc dut:- tc '"im sc tc do.
’’An atterr.pt tc mcnopclize a part c^ interstate ccmm.erce wh'c' promotes
or but indirectly or Incidentally restricts, cempotitien therein,
while its main purpose and chief effect are tc increase th^ t‘‘’ade and
foster the busines.s cf those who rnaVe it, wa.s not intended tc he made
and was not made ille£-al by the second S"c+icn because such attempts are
indispensable to the '^xi stance cf any ccmpetiticr i^^ cO'mrr.orc<'- amrnr
the s tates .
”
Remedies Under the Act. From th'^ pcirt vtew of ^enedies '!'’^e
statute necessarily departed from the proee'^ur'^ und r t^e cenmen law,
both because cf the ccnitttttirn c" "^b federal courts and ’’^ecaus^ tl-e
common lav/ remedies for offences ag’ainst trade and ccmrrerce v/ere cum-
bersome in the extreme. Under the Act, the circuit courts wore -
vested with jurisdiction tc pre'ent and restra-'n violations o^ the Act
by injunction, on petition cf the several district atterne-s the
United States, under the dlreeticn o'- t>^» Attrrney Gereral.
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TeniDorarv injunctions might he grante<!l peniinr tlo inal iecree O- '^e
court. The court may cause witnesses and other persons concerne'^ to
he summoned whetlier they reside in the Mstri-ct in which court is
held or not, hy subpoena served hy the Llarshal of the district,
Property i-.volved in any violation of t-he i^ct, and in the course o'"
transportation in interstate traTric, may he forfeited to the rni''ed
States, and seized and condemned under. proceedi nga similar to those
provided for forfeiture and con .lemnat ion of property imported into the
Unit-ed otates contrary to law. A provision was also mad<^ for three-
fold damages, together v/ith costs and a ro-ascnahle attorney’s fee, to
he recovered hy any person injured in his huslness or prop^rtv t’ rourh
unlawful acts of persons or corporat ions
.
Prior to the Act approved 7eh. '^5, IfC, t^'.ere wss no way in "rhin^
a witness could he compelled to testi"^’* in a proceedi'P- und<^r 'he Act,
before a grand jury as to tlie witness’ ccnnecticn ^•’i''h "'''f' ec'"h-'‘ -la' ic'^
ij’oot V. Buchanan, 112 Fed. 156. This was because the Sherman Act
was a criminal statute. The Act of Fob. 25, 19Cd^, (Laws 19C'^, ch.
755) extended to the Sherman Act the previsions of See. 36C, U. ?.
Rev. 3t
. ,
declaring that no pe son shall he prosecuted or subject tc
any penalty or forfeiture for or on account o"^ any transaction, mat'er
or thing, concerning which he may te-stify or produce evidence in an37’
proceeding under the Act. At the present tire, then, v;itr.e?=?es may he
compelled to testify both before a grand jur;^ and at the trial a
case under the ^et, and can no longer ta^e refuc^e behind f^a' provision
of tiie criminal law which excuses any'’ person from incrimina tinm him-
self.
Several technical rules of pleading arise under the statute, hut
inasmuch as tney do not involve the suhstant'’ve la7/, they/ ma'”’ ’ 0 d i s -

mpaed wit:i little liscussicn. Chief arr.obr ther?o rules is pe haps
that one ^Thich declares that a violaticr. of the Act cannot he raise'’
in .a collateral pro.cee :in§- • In Lafayette Lriif-e Co. v. th^ City c-f"
Streator, 105 Feci. 729, it was held that it coul-^ net pleaded a- a
defense to a suit for payment "cr moc'S, that the se]l*r is a trust and
within the provisions of the anti-trust law. Another rule c"’ consld-
erahle importance is tc the eff'^ct t’-a^ the statute w’- -i le r>ou tai - r-
criminai provisions is now reccrnize'l as remedial. In Pice v. Ti^e
Standard Oil Co. 1.S4 Fed. 464, a strict rule o " pleadinr as en-’’*crced
on the theory that the .-^ct was penal only, hut this dcctr^'ne has been
repudiated. Addystcn Pipe & Steel Co. Case, 175 I'. 2. 211. TTcrth-
ern Securities Co. Case 195 U.S.197. F.cntayue v. Lowry, 195 . 55.
xwo minor points raisdd in repard to damapes recove ahle ma’’ he
state! here: These are the dif'^ercnce "’“etwecn ":h" price pal’, and t^e
reasonable price of the commodity under natural competitive conditions,
City of Atlanta v. Chattanoopa Foundry Cc.,127 Fed. 25. The provisions
for t e r-.GOvery of three-fold damares lo net apply in the case of one
'wiio was IriKiself a party to t’ne trust. Eishop v. American Preserves
Ca.
,
105 Fed . S45
.
L. ”?he True Reason of the Eemedy." (Purpose of the Act.)
The Influence of Economic Conditions, At the ti^-^e that the Sh«rman
Law 'was enacted, industrial conditiers in “he United. States had heen
rapidly apprcachinp a crisis, and it was becominp more and more evi-
dent to far-sighted legislators that a small minority In "^he economii^




disproportionate aggregate of capital,
in all lines of development in trade. commerce means

If
comiTiUri i cat ioK
,
carried ir. its train an extension oi* devices secirinr’
the control of vast enterprises, hitherto vri^-hont precedeir^ ei*-Vnr
here or abroad. Debates in Genf^ress at this ti'^e indicate that
both houses 7/ere a’.vare of the dan£-er v/hich threateiied, and t^’^y
recognized some lef'islative action vas imperati”e i ^re'don o'’ tra">e
v/as to be preserved. In the opinion of Ch^'.e^ Justice 7hTto, as ex-
pressed in the Standard Oil Case, these debates conclusive!:: s’-'cv/ t^at
the main cause \7hich led to the enactment of the anti-trust lav vas
"the thought that it vas required by the economic condition o“^ the
times, that is, the vast accumulation of voalth in the hands of corpora'- ? o n
and individuals, the enormous development of corporate organization,
the facility for combination V7hic]i such organizations afforded
,
the
fact that the facility was being used, and that combinations Vno7/n as
trusts were being multiplied, and the 7/ifdespread irn'oressicn that their
po7/er had been and would be exerted to oppress individuals, and injure
the public generally."
Tentat'ive Bills. Previous to the passage of the Act of July ?, 189C
several bills 7/e‘re. proposed in the Senate to deal 7/th governmental
control of interstate trade. These are of importance in determining
the legislative purpose of the act as '^’inaldy passed, since they, to-
gether 7/ith discussions up n them, indicate the att'tude O"^ Congress
towards the problem. The first of these was a bill introduced by
Senator Sherman on December 4, 1339 which contained su'^stant daily
following provisions: first, it declared to be against public policy,
unlav/ful and void, all arrangements
,
contracts, agreements, '-r-”3ts,
or combinat iOiiS between persons or corporations, cent emplat inr -^he pre-
vention of full and free competition in interstate traffi'c -^n articles
imported into the United Slates, or produced here; and in tfeb produc-
tion and mianufacture of such articles; secondly, the bill -nrohibitod
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any afrreemer ts or corporations v:h1c-h were lesirne'^ or ten'^ei to
advance the cost to the consumer of any these art'cles. i’rcm
this it appears that the plst of the proposal was to prohibit int'^r'^er-
ence with competition and also to prevent artificial advances in the
price of articles in ii^terstate and foreign commerce. This hill was
referred zo the Senate Gcramittee on Ij’inance and was reported on January
14, 1890. On February 27, Senator Sherman no’'’'ed th- ^ena + e to proceed
to the consideration the bill and discussion -its prcvis'cns im-
mediately bepan. Doubt v/as expressed as. to the cons ti tut Icnad i ty o -"he
bill, notably by Senator Secrpe of liiss iss ippi , who -^urther ob^ecte-^
that the prohibition was confined to conspiracies ara"'"'=‘^ tra^’.e and 'Tid
not include overt acts dene in pursuance 0 “^ t’-'cn. On accou’^'^ o-^ t^'^'s
and other objections, the Committee on Finance presented a suhsti'^ute
for the till on Llarch 21, 139C, which proposed to strenfthc- its con-
stitutional foundation’ by cenfininf its prohibitions to combinations o'*
ciLizeiis of uifferont states. For this amendment Senator Fearan o-^
Texas offerred a substitute v;riio!i attempted to define restrai^.ts
trade and monopolies so accurately as to remove any doubt as to ‘‘he e'^-
feot of the Act upon any given transaction. D-*bate upon these ‘^.wc suh-
atitutions- for the original bill showed that while particular senators
objected strongly to one or the other, nevertheless there V7as a general
consensus of opinion that the object for t/hlch they v/ere bof" intended
was highly ibportant, and that it was merely a mestion 7/ha'*' ^orm
the law should take.
'The Passage of the Sherman Act . On April 2, 1390, Senator hdmunds, "^he
chairman of the Judiciary Committee, reported >^acd' the original Sherman
bill and its amendments, acc-ompan-' ed by a new substitute "^or ‘^hom all.
That substitute, probably drawn by Senator "car liassac^^us o’" ts and
not bj oencxLiOr oher-man as is common^^ S'lipposed, was

^.dentical in every v;crd with the ^^herrnan Act as "t 7;as a^t^rwar'^s
passed by both Houses of Congress, and. approved hy President Farrlscn
on July 2, 1B9C . Cohs iderat ion of the Hear suhstltiit^ for •'•he Sher-
rr.an bill began on April 3, 1890, on motion of 8ena + or Fear. The hill
was passed the Senate and sent to the ''oupe, where on Apr-i] 11,
199C, it was taben from the speaker’s table and re^^erred to the Houpe
Committee on Judiciary. In the House, an ameridment was efferred b^"
Hr. Bland of Missouri to the effect that agreements prev<^nting competi-
tion in the sale or purchase o^ commodities transported from o^r state
to another should be prohibited, together with combi rat ion? pre'^^entin?
competition in transportation persons between States or Territories.
In the Senate, this amendment was again amended sc that only the second
proposition was allc7/ed to stand in the MU as rev^'sed. k^ter con-
ferences betv;een the House and Senate, however, it '^inally came about
that both amendments were drcpp"-'‘d, and the Act as or ’ginall''’ proposed
was passed in both Houses, and approved b:/ the President.
From an examination of the various bills cf'forrod to regulate
monopolies and restraints cf trade, it is evident that the primary pur-
pose of Congree was to prevent undue suppression O"’^ cempet
t
ic’" .
Exactly what restraint of competition was due and what undue, hewe-'-er,
does net appear from the ‘’'cdy cf these bills and neither doeo it appear
that the members had any clear cpinicn cf the di-'.-iding line between
proper and improp'-'r control cf ccmipet iticn . In three respects the
debates throw some light on the meaning cf the words, ’’restraint
trade ',’altbcugh the cemmeh law question cf reasonableness seems not to
have been raised. In the first place, the members cf Congress considered
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membero of a combination and of extraneous restraint exercised by tbe
f
combination as a whole against one or mere other parties. IText, the
fact was emphasieed that restraints nrchibite-l by 'l-h-? Act were confined
to direct restraints of interstate commerce, the precis'® line
\
between direct and indirect res'^ra^'^ts was net drawn, ncr was as"’ sn<=_
tincticn made between reasonable and unreasonable restraints. Finally
restraints under the Act were net intended to he unlawful if +^'ey
.yvero net extensive enough to be materialdi” iniurious to pu’’'l''c or pri
-
bate welfare. In regard to the second section o-^ th^ Act "•h« view
Senator Fdmunds was general; namely, that •f-he word ’’m.cncpodi n'® in
law includes the idea that the monopolist in acqu-’ring the thi’^r
monopolized in some way prevented ct'^ers '^rom competing hif^ -ir]
attaining complete control of the given trade or industry. Senator
Hoar stated that the members of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate
agreed that the word rnoncpclise means ” engrossing to a m.an's cel-^
by means which prevent other men from engaging in fair competition 7/ith
him”. Gong. Iddc. 51 Cong. 1st. Sess., .S151. From t'lic it follows
that Section 2 is net violated where a party completely accu-rcs a
particular part of interstate cr internat icnal commorco by moans his
superior skill cr superior facilities.
Contemplated Dependence upon the Comimon Law. There seems to be no
direct ovidcnce that the question of the relaticr between “^he Sherman
Act and the common law was raised in the case of restraints tra'"e.
Probably much of the, later confusion in the interpretation of the
first section resulted from the fact that tliere was no definite i^iea
as to its application; ncr was the precise degree to v;hi^^ it was depen-
dent on the common law specified or discussed. In regard to se-
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t'l'Ie of the Senate on the conternplatecl relationship Tetween the
statuie and the eommon law. During debate on this section, a'^ter
Senator Hoar had promulgated the definition of monopoly a"" ore set
forth. Senator Kenna inquired whether si3ch a monouoly as had been
defined v/as prohibited at common law. On the reply Senator Hoar
that he so understood. Senator Henna thereupon asbeii why a bill
should be passed to denounce a monopoly already illegal at common lar;
/
To this Senator Hoar replied that there was no common law of " he
United States, and that the common law of the separate states cannot,
as such, be enforced by the federal courts by means o-^ any penalty
or punishment. Gong. Hec. 51 Cong. 1st. Sess
. 31.51.
It is evident from the foregoing that Congress reccgni.ned that
no action cculd be talron by the federal government a ainst trusts and
monopolies, unless positive enactment to tha*^, ef^’ect were made. If
common law principles were ai cuate to deal with t>^e prcbVm, it
-.-as
nevertheless necessary that they be incorporated into the federal la”
by legislative sanction, Tl^e question new comes in this ^orm:
Did Congress actually intend to maloe use of common law urlnciules, and
is the -Sherman Act notliing more or less than the realisation 6f t^ris
inten^icn? A definite answer, complete as to ever'^^ uhaso O'” t^®
subject, cannot be given, but one or two facts can be sper^.-^ind
v/hich are valuable in thrcT/ing Tight cn the whole. In th^ ”irst
place. Congress certainly intended a departure from the common law in
respect to remedy; federal prededure ref uired a departure from involv-
ed common law principles of pleading, bith because of the increasing
tendency to simpolfy all matters cf ad.iective lar;, and because t^'c ends
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thas b:y thcae of the lav; courts. It is equally certalr thr,t the second
section of the ^ct conteinplat c*d no departure from the ccncicn lav;. The
questicn v;as deficitely raised iu the manner described ahc^^e, and the
entire purpose cf the statute in sc far as -it concerned mcnopcli^^s ’A'a?
to embody the ccmrncn law in I'nited States law. The indetermirat
e
part of the problem arises in reference to the first sp-ctior, and here
no lipht can be obtained f’rcm statem‘-‘’^ts ma-'e ‘*' 0 '’Icor c” Ccrpreps
,
So far, then, we must say th*:t ’ h--' actual i’^tert these who passed
the bill cannot be determined. Biit t’ner^ is cr.e indicat-ion t>-'et
common law principles should be decisive cf points raised in t'r.e inter-
pretation cf the Act, and that is this: the Sh‘^;rraan Act avcv/edl''^ adopts
the common lav/ in dealin?' with mcnopclies; why, then, should it be in-
terpreted as meaning something entirely different •'’rem the ccm^cn law
in regard to restraints cf trade, especiall:/ wV’en such a departure is
not definitely announced? The lav/ mcncnc''' and f'^at o'" restra"'nts
of trade are mutually supplementary; they both deal v/ith ere great
problem, the viclaticr. cf public rights in the freedom trade and
cumu.erce. The guiding principles of th- common lav; V'-ave >"00?^ chosen
to regulate mo no dies, thus disposing cf 'ne side cf th“ Question.
Vi'ithcut acme strong intimation tc th? t effedt, it dc-^^s net seem, lively
that in dealing with the ether p*=rt cf the case these leral rules
should be abandoned and ether tests sot up in their stea-^. T’^is is
the core true, because any test substituted ^cr es tablis’^^-d
criteria is necessarily untried; and it is impcs'S'iblo tc determine
in advance cf judicial in terpretaticr what its e"sct will be.
Were such a new test tc be formulated, it would seem probable that
extreme care wculd be talTen by the legislstive body tc speci'^y exact
ly these cases tc which it should apply.
-‘n the discussion of the
a? -i.
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Sherman Act, however, the course in ’cti" r;cus»^s c^’ Conc^resp
shows that to seme • xtent they vere content to let ;?ulicial inter-
pretation guided by established principles, determine the application
of the new law against restraints of trade. That being pc, tt-’eir
gBBeral intention was plain, but their sp^ci-^lc intention was no mere
definite than to afford a remedy against the inereas'nr encrca'^>-m»^^t
s
combinations on the liberty of Individuals. In cases 1 iho thes*"
,
when there is no specific intent, th<=^ general intent must be Interpret
ed in terms of pre-existing lav;; there is no alternative. And this
pre-existing lav; must be the cemmen lav;, for there is nc other body
of dfficisiODS on which to r-ly, wh-.n the construction o'" an entr'rel”
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Ill Summary ar i Conclusior]
It remains to summarize the major and minor )iremises, and to draw
the conclusion from them. The major premise analyses the common lav/
in regard to contracts, combinations an' conspiracies in restraint of
trade and monox)Olies'; and "^he minor premise analyses these sai^e arree-
ments and devices under the Sherman Act.
Summary of the ?.IaJor Premise. I^estraints o tra"^^ are to b^ consider-
ed as voluntary or involuntary. Involuntary restrai t? are by mran'^'s
or charters from the crown, or by custom, and are not nres^n"^ Tmpor-
tance in the discussion of principles controlling the rights parties
who themselves enter into contracts restraining trade. In moVrn
times, only voluntary restraints arc »)romiinent, since the-- alone deter-
mine the relationship botv/cen the subject an! the sovereign v/’-en the
question cf freedom of trade and commerce arises. Voluntary res'^raint
in order to be valid must be partial, must rest on an adecua'^e consid-
eration, and must be reasonable. P^easonabl eness is determined by
striking a balance between the injury to the party restrained or to the
public, and the use to the ^>arty receiving the benefit of the transac-
tion, Ihe injury to the x:)arty ana to the public is to be determined
in the 1 ight of public policy which necessarily varies from time to
At common law contracts in restraint o^ trade were unlawful
merely, and void, and no criminal liability attached. * Com.-
binations and conspiracies i restraint o'!’ trade on th^' other hand
were prohibited as m.isdemeanors or felonies ns the. r^ase mis-ht b-
,
both
at commcn law and under early statutes. These v/sre de'^lne'^ 1^ a
seri-.s of statutes extending from the time of the Anmlo-Saxon "'-i ngs to
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Tc conpt i tiTt® a’^hese early statutes were punisba'ble as crimes .
mocopcly, four elements are necessary: a yrar'^ frrm the sovereign, a
definite frantee, a riarticular henefit or ripht ^iven tc t’’%t e*rartee,
and an exclusion of the nutlic at large from participation in ri?-’’ts or
privileges formerly enjoyed.
'Summary of the tlinor Premise. Ihe Sherman Act has passed throuf»-h
three periods o •' interriretat ion : one in which it was ‘'roadly in^'^-'preted
in the light of the Common law, another in v;hich danruare was con-
sidered to apply to all restraints c trale, whether lawful or unlaw-
ful at common law, and a third in which judicial op’nion reverted to
thtt of the first period. In determining the relation the Act to
yhe Common Law, onl^’ those rules and decisions need 'be considered auth-
oritative vyriich are not Inconsistent with the final cc strr.cticn o'’ the
Act adopted by the Supreme Court in the Standard '^il and Tchac'co Cases.
Under these decisions, and under others not centrarv to the rulings
there laid down, restraints of traio must new ho decide’ under the
’’rule of reason”. This ’’rule reasen” inc':udes as pro -rocu i s ' tes
the doctrine that the restraint must ’’'o partial an’ must rest upon
adequate consideration, and in ad'’itior,, it contemplates, as as-erte'-'!
hy Chief Justice V/hito that the inherent reasenah Icnes ' cT the trans-
action shall ’oe examin'id in accordance with, pre-existinf princiules
of the common lav/. These ccr.tracts, however, as cc rtras te ' with
their common lav/ status, are now made criminal. Do m'bina'^ ic ns an’’
consi^iracies under the Act may include unlawful contracts, ’nut they are
omethinf more: an unlawful element must appear, and whether this
ta’>oea the form of an unlawful agreement or oi’ an illegal device for
the fa up pre ts io n or c ompe tition, or t'lo liVe, its orosence, together
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3 d, constitutes the offence. ITo overt act is necessary Ir -^he '••a^e
conspiracies in restaint o^" traie, as the arreorr-ent c" the nar^ •’>s to
it, is the crime prohihitcd. T'oncnolies u der the Act, althouph some
indef ini tcness stil] remains in the interpretation of the second sectio>7
^
seem to > r practically identical with common law monopolies,
when once the necessity for a prant from the scvereirn is removed. ,The
exclusive ripht formerly granted "by the ‘hinr, is now obtained by the
use of unlawful means in the suppression of competition or in prevent-
ing the public at large from participation in the giv^n irdnptry. In
the case of remedies and c" the addictive lav applicable to the inter-
pretation of the Act in general
,
there is a sharp departur'^ -^rom tbf; com-
mon lav/ procedure, but this Is no c-rea'^’cr than must cccessf^r-’ result




In forraul* ting the conclusion to the syllogism set -^orth
at the beginning of this 'dissertation, essential pc^^nts of identity" in
the CO ''s t ruction of the Sherman Ac*, and in the Common la"’ mi:st be reg8'’c6-
ed, and details of a'j’^ctivo law may be negledted in determininr the
actual relationship botv/eon the Statute an! tho Common Law. This dis-
sertation is not intended to prove that in all respects cases under the
Sherman .i.ct must be decided in accordance v/ith previous decisions at
the common law, but t)iat tiie underlying- principles are the same in both
cases, i’rom the analyses of decisions under the ^wo bodies o^ lav/, it
appears that in regard to both restraints of trade and mcnopclies, the
principles' on which the individual judgments re.yt, are i^ent-'.cal. The
validity of ccntracts res traini nr" trade was common law dependent on
the presence or absence of three elements, namely: v/ae ' contract
partial, aid it rest on adeguate cons 1 dera^ ion
,
was it reasonable? The
r ro>?st(s^ -5 330,
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is depcn'^ent ir. turn upon the l^enefit toreasoncableness of tlie dontrsict
^he obligee, the detriment to the obligifcr.and the ef:^ect on the prhlio
at large. If the detriment to the obligor and to g- >1 i ^ '••a? incom-
mensurable V7ith the benefit received > 3^ t^e obi igee , V'^en contract
v/as unlawful. Tnaer the Sherman Act the same elements ar<» neeessarg to
the legality of such con tracts ; net only mu?t it be partial an 1 rOvSt on
adequate cons idorat ion , but since the decision in "^he Standard Cil Case,
it must be reasonable. The reasonableness is that reasena'*- lones r r^ic^
has been defined by common law courts, and since this is so it must nec-
essarily be reasonableness dependent on the- usefulness of the contract
to the party receiving the benefit of it, as compared to the damage sns-
tained by the p rty making the contract, and to tlic general e'dfec* upon
interstate trade and commerce. Althm^gh the court has not in terms de-
clared that these three elements must appear in order to make the con-
tract legal under the present interpretation of tlie Ac t , nevertheless be-
fore the period of rigid interpretat ion was entered upon, the courts in
general recognized these three elements as constituting reasonableness.
It does not follow from tlie identitj^ of these rules in regard to rostra rt
of trade that the federal courts are bound >y early cases at the comm.cn
law, but it does follow that these same earl^? cases must he regarded as
of controlling influence in form;ula t ing rules under the present aT)pl i
-
cation of the Act, That Is to sa;/, tha< whereas public policy has
shifted, and v/hereas a restraint whicT: might once nave been o-” detri-
ment (to the public is no longer such that it interferes vith tVe free-
dom of trade and commerce, nevertheless the fundamental principles upon
which original cases rested, are still valid in cur law todaj'. The
question uf public policy is the only variable factor in '^he equation,
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vieyy, the ether Questions are new the sfiTe ss In the ferm-^r times.
I
This indicates nc chanf^e in ti-ie law itself, hut emphasises rather a
change in ecoccraic cenditiens under which the law is applied. ^ cen-
traat in;juricu3 te the public in one age say be a positive bene-^lt tc if
in another, and the case will be decided one way in the earlier period
and another in the later. Yet, although the actual decision is dif-
ferent, the princi 'l“S on which it rests a'l^e '*''6 same. At both tines,
there is a balancing cf benefit tc the one and detriment ’’he ot’-er;
and the economic development c^' th<^ naticr determines '’h'’’ch wa^
balance falls.
Combinations and ccnspiracie? under the Act ten-^ natural I"’ tc
grouped with m^oncpclies rather than with restraints cf trade proper.
This is 30 for the reason that the ssential element in the ec 'is t tut icy\
of these offences is the unlawful d ans whereby they are effected^
rather than in the fact that they actually restrain trade. Earl-^^
statutes against engrossing, regrating, and forestalling the mar-'et,
practically amount^ tc statutes against wh&t aro new called
combinations and conspiracies in restra^'nt trade. Ccnsidcring
these offences to be the sam- in spite cf the change in name, it
appears that both at common lav.' and under the federal law, unlav/ful
means was tiie criterion upon which their l^galitv dependended.
While the act of engross ing
,
regrs t ing cr forestsllinp-, itself constit-
uted the offence, nevertheless, in the final anal''’sia, all these crimes
amounted tc transactions restraining trade in a prohibitr'<=! marner.
Hence it is, that the means 's important in thsse earl;^ stat-nt<=>s. The
actual securing cf staple ccmm.cdit iss was net t’-'^ g-'’s'^ o'" tvo
...
J.






B t B T .'‘j1-*2j!: • b T ‘'i'.* rri i>‘3r!tir'o P.l 3? J'bo : hai ';t:iT ,
-'’00 .& 'rqoB 8T doTdr~: en-oi-^-f'rfoo rii: t?'^na.io
1 j" * •:• vrr'-.^q ?»•/ ";.*i; e'-B r-jo cl rJ-ifirq •r’fJ •: :'r:f
f\5
f'jL*ri«q Tf^xlTBe- or'* ni: T.avr rt>f. lOt-f; ud IT/t: j'.bo orir t;i .lodr jda’ 5i
_
«>
^ p> r ;
‘r- r.-





f ^ - • • ^Jel -hj lib 'Snt'3 ycit*
>> ''*' ^
t-^ v- -ro" XA .‘»2T3r 5''^ OTS StS'-'<- 0 ^ "T 2‘‘X loorofi OilX ,dwt>
• T 0T
'** ‘*'^0 P r t
-
-0 r -1 ^ a 3X 98
X ^ ”'>\y7 -iry ' fl-t’
‘





--r r BT .' ‘ .-fr bv'-— t'lX. '?'’** ' - ' ‘7B*2 r(T3n ;r F j: - 3n ai xauid.'n pO ^ j
‘,S
. ffOT-’ * "! D >
‘
•,
'i»t *0 jT .'*'r .^3.'* 'I « T B3 8 I " f 0 r).T' '^rv heOBOI-ai
^ yt’.t"
* ^ 3 ' .-0 * "f t.'^f'fA^ r '• X -• 1
1
*:*? BS J.'rii * .‘i. '.x «XrfT
•,
j-
•'•.t?-*??'' -• r^'i "* •/'<:^ ,' &.'i.-^ !" I ’.T**” v: ‘ i mr • bi i‘i o aboi-.X iO
'r*r32 - ?*r ^ ^'•'r •'ffBB'oB '.'c/j rB.’- Lix *i4xiw3*i
^
-,'f ‘ >r;xXi ’* '’To’i, f>^'P - , "8^ ^eeot'an-.,
jvnrr,.'
*Ti,* • 'rr t-rrl '-r;* i:\jJca "XXBOXoOa'iq
'^2 '
*r-.'X ] 3BdC . jb-2 ’r t ’^o ,trr ai t :j-^*r 2! a : •. •i rqir.o-j r srr"?! X aaidziOD
•?r
,
-B' Tib -8B8.'’!n ' * '^v>Xrf:ii rii- „as- ' ed jX aoonj-’:a ^S’odJ





. r.of'fr'-f B'vjof- vtxr ^^-r 2?9rX doi Ajqir noiivXi'iy --.ij aaw ^.^aeca
-*--t =•'>»> ^ . -=2MI T3 8''‘ x?'rMS2
.
qn i 83 J1820 ion e.ix :*iXdV.'






-f>-i c -i r-r -r
-/-J-CT B ;TX 82 1 " ' B'Y X S*^’! 22 jX X 0 B 3 B'f T 3d b 9 J iltJ OXia
9"?'^ o
-»
rr -• .-» t r •^r^,qr. rr*’ *'.8ilX8 OrTiTlX ' r.2B9X3 9" * ^ *
,
.,1 XX 9029’;




-f ' ar? 2«i X t X ^ O^TX! 39 ^XoijX^ ‘t 0 82187098 LtSltTOB ' j
aay cacse, but this was rather the way in 7/hich they were obtained,
iloncpolies at common law contained the four elements already e'x-
plained at length, namely: the grant from the king, the definite
grantee, the exclusive right, and the restriction of others from par-
ticix;ation in that right. Gradually both in Idngland and in this
country, the first requisite of’ a mcnepoly vvas done awa:/ with, hdt'^
in the common thought of the people and in the lav? as well. At pre-
sent however, it seems that mcnopelies are identical wif^. ‘"’^ose pro-
hibited by the common law, except for t^e fact f-at the original grant
is not nevessi-.ry. At both common law and un "er modern de-^initions of
the offence, it is the usurpation of the control a trade or indus-
try by one man or by a bc*dy of men, together with the disregard o the
rights of the public generally, which was and is considered the gi?t
of the -offence. The difference arises only in the way in which the
monopoly is secured; formerly it ?;ap >'y express grant, not it
is by the acts of the individual. These acts must be unlawful, as
otherwise there would be a restriction upon acquisition o-^ urcuert^’-
by simple s>ill and industry, an idea which is repugnant to f-^e
Anglo-Saxon mind. Other than this, however, there seems to '''e no
fundamental difference between monepelies now and formerly, as in
both cases it is the assumpition of rights belonging +c t>-e public which
tinge the transaction 7/ith criminality.
Finally, then, by comparison of the mafer and minor premises, it
is apparent that the effect cf thw Sherman Act in regard to restraints
of trade and moncpolies is the same as that of f'he common law, excent
in r-;gard to remedy, which is essentallly ad;eft-’’ve and not substan-
tive law. And it fellows from thl- identity of principles that the
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Ithe United States befcre the per^pape cf the Act, V7hlch itself is
ite and pcscible of exact deterininat ion
,
in sc far as anp rule o ''
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